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                       ABSTRACT 
  The Hukou system has been a basic institution in Chinese society for several 
decades. My thesis explores whether, after nearly 30 years of reform and opening up 
in China, this system still plays a role in individuals’ lives and if so, what is this role? 
This study uses qualitative data from policy documents and quantitative data from the 
China General Social Survey 2003 to examine differences in income and access to 
welfare services among rural and urban Hukou holders and in Hukou status 
conversion both before and since the reform era and point out that the Hukou system 
contributes to inequality in individuals’ life chances in two dimensions: resource 
allocation and Hukou status conversion. The findings show that urban residents are 
advantaged in resource allocation before and in the reform era; the control mechanism 
of “quota” and “policy” for Hukou status conversion from rural to urban in the 
pre-reform era was replaced by the locally defined but nationally enforced “entry 
conditions” or “requirements” in reform era. The talented people, the CCP members, 
the people who have permanent jobs in urban areas, and the people whose family 
members hold urban Hukou are more likely now to overcome the Hukou-based 
control. The Hukou-based migration control continues on a localized basis and 
excludes the majority of rural residents from access to the rights enjoyed by urban 
residents. The findings of this thesis indicate that the consequences of the Hukou 
system continue today and additional reform still needs to be introduced. 
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CHAPTER 1  
                       INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
   One of the most glaring legacies of 20th-century Chinese socialism is a sharp and 
widened divide between China’s urban and rural areas (Wang, 1999). China’s widened 
urban-rural divide arose from a socialist industrialization process, which created a 
hastened heavy-industrial base at the expense of its rural population. (Whyte, 1996)  
The old divisions that separated rural and urban Chinese geographically in the 
pre-reform era are now replaced by barriers that segregate rural populations 
economically and socially within cities (Wang, 1999). Such inequality has been 
institutionalized by the Hukou system (household registration system), which has been 
in place for more than 50 years and had a significant impact on many aspects of life 
for people living in the People’s Republic. 
  After the founding of new China, the state claimed there was a “pressing need for 
a national Hukou management”: 
    On the one hand, we need to find out enemies quickly, assist struggles against the enemy, 
and maintain the revolutionary order through the Hukou management that controls the 
information on the population. On the other hand, we can provide data to the agencies of 
the state for their making policies and plans through Hukou management that controls the 
population. 1 
 Starting as a means of social control, the Hukou system administratively collected 
and managed the information of citizens’ personal identification, kinship, and legal 
residence as a “necessary foundation of the overall population management and social 
administrations” (Jiang and Luo 1996, p. 218) After establishing the planned economy 
 1
                                                        
1 An instructional manual for PRC hukou official in 1994 
 
 and the development strategy of giving high priority to heavy industry, the PRC 
Hukou system initially played the role of an instrument of development policy and has 
evolved into socioeconomic exclusion. In order to finance the expansion of industry, 
the state induced an ‘unequal exchange’ between the agricultural and industrial 
sectors. To maintain such an artificial imbalance under the condition of a dual 
economy, the state had to find a mechanism to block free flow of resources (including 
labour) between industry and agriculture and between cities and the countryside. 
(Chan, 1999) The Hukou system was one of the important means to set up and 
maintain such a social and economic configuration and also closely linked with 
resource allocation and distribution in the pre-reform era. People’s basic necessities of 
life – food, clothing, housing and transportation; education and employment, welfare 
and social security – are all related to some extent to their Hukou. Under this system, 
some 800 million rural residents are treated as inferior or second-class citizens 
deprived of the right to settle in cities and to most of the basic welfare and 
government provided services enjoyed by urban residents, ranging from small benefits 
like being able to buy a city bus pass, to much more important matters such as 
enrolling their children in public schools in cities where their parents work. (Solinger, 
1999) In the pre-reform era, the population mobility was strictly controlled by the 
Hukou system, while in the reform era, peasants could move to the city but are denied 
permanent residency rights and many of the associated social benefits. (Chan, 2008) 
Researchers are still baffled by many tales of peasant migrants’ plight, and their 
 2
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truggle 
 well established, the Hukou system is a cornerstone of China’s infamous 
ru ith 
 
h 
 Research Question 
of this thesis is as follows: In what ways does the Hukou 
sy
n the Hukou system is concerned, previous studies by Chinese 
sc
 
d 
                                                       
unequal treatment2 and no substantive change was found in peasant migrants’ s
for equality and the right to the city in 2005, 2006 and 2007. (Zhao and Guo, 2007) 
As is
ral–urban ‘apartheid,’ (Alexander and Chan, 2004) creating a system of ‘cities w
invisible walls.’ (Chan, 1994) It is a major source of injustice and inequality. (Yu, 
2002)  At the core of the household registration system are two measures: dividing
citizens into two categories – those with agricultural Hukou and those with non- 
agricultural Hukou – and putting them under local government administration wit
strict control over changes in Hukou. (Lu, 2008)  
  
1.2
The primary concern 
stem create social inequality? After 20 years reform of Hukou system, does the 
inequality still exist? 
So far as research o
holars have been limited to discussing the necessity and importance of establishing 
the Hukou system in the pre-reform era, reform of the system within the framework of
a dual structure, or exploring technical matters related to the reform of the Hukou 
management system. All these studies are based mainly on common knowledge an
general reasoning, and have had some positive results in analyzing the holistic social 
influence of the household registration system and appealing for reform. (Lu, 2008) 
 
2 A report of migrants’ plight in Shenzhen is in Howard French, ‘‘Chinese success story chokes on its 
own growth,’’ The New York Times, 19 December 2006 
 
   The discussion on the impact of Hukou system on social equality is heated. 
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ation 
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arch 
Previous studies explore the problem from two perspectives: to examine the rel
between Hukou system and the inequality under the dual structure and to examine the
Hukou system and inequality in individual’s lives. The theory of “Lewis model” was 
applied in many studies to explore the relationship between Hukou system and the 
inequality under dual economic structure. Kam Wing Chan put forward in 1999 tha
the Hukou system contributes to the formation of a dual society of rural and urban 
areas. In Feiling Wang’s work, the Hukou system was regarded as stable and effect
institutional exclusion which provide remedies to a dual economy to allow for an 
accelerated economic growth and technological development. (Wang 2005b, p. 19
  Hukou system significantly affects personal life in many respects. Within the 
bour market, Yang and Guo pointed out that the tasks in which the temporary 
workers are engaged are typically those which urban permanent residents are 
unwilling or unable to do. (Yang and Guo, 1996) Through empirical study, Gu
Iredale (2004) confirm that the Hukou system was based on ‘ascribed’ attributes that 
largely influence the occupational attainment and labor market returns. On the life 
chances, Xiaogang Wu and Zhiqiang Liu confirmed separately that people of rural 
and urban origins differ substantially in their access to educational and political 
opportunities that may help them move upward in the socialist hierarchy. In rese
on the impact of Hukou system on stratification and mobility, Xiaogang Wu made an 
extraordinary contribution. Using data from a 1996 national probability sample, 
Xiaogang Wu (2004) shows that education and membership in the Chinese 
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 in the 
to six chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the 
re , a 
dological approaches to the study of inequality 
un
ates the inequality 
Communist Party are the main determinants of mobility across Hukou status
further study in 2007 explained the usual “openness” in the intergenerational mobi
in current urban population by China’s distinctive population registration system, 
which simultaneously fails to protect rural-origin men from downward mobility an
permits only the best educated to attain urban registration status. (Wu, 2007) 
According to the foregoing introduction of Hukou system, at the core of the ho
gistration system are two measures: dividing citizens into two categories – those 
with agricultural Hukou and those with non- agricultural Hukou – and putting them
under local government administration with strict control over changes in Hukou. (L
2008) In this study, I separately elucidate the inequality under Hukou system before 
and in the reform era from two aspects, resource allocation and Hukou status 
conversion. Through contrasting the inequality in these two aspects before and
reform era, I point out that these inequalities caused by the Hukou system before the 
reform era continue today. 
This thesis is organized in
sidential registration, inequality and Hukou system. Based on the literature review
theoretical framework, which focus on the resource allocation and opportunities of 
Hukou status conversion, is discussed. 
Chapter 3 discusses the major metho
der Hukou system between two groups of people. A combined quantitative and 
qualitative methodology was used to conduct an empirical study. 
Drawing on regulations and policy documents, Chapter 4 elabor
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1. Significance of Study 
nt years’ social surveys, research on Hukou system and 
in
 aims 
ras, 
preting official statements on 
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der the Hukou system in pre-reform era from two aspects of differentiations of 
resources allocation and regulation and process of Hukou status conversion. 
Chapter 5 examines the correlation of Hukou type and resource allocation 
terminants of Hukou status conversion by applying the statistics of China General 
Social Survey to indicate the inequality under Hukou system in reform era. 
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis by summarizing the main results of this re
d also touches on the possibility for future study. 
 
3 
Applying data from rece
equality in individual’s lives only reflect conditions in the reform era with no 
reference to inequalities in individual’s lives in the pre-reform era. This research
to move beyond the current research limitations to explore the impact of Hukou 
system on the inequality in individual’s lives both in the pre-reform and reform e
and to point out some changes in the reform eras. 
  Since the mid-1990s, journalists have been inter
‘reforms’ of the Hukou system as presaging an end to the system. They claim tha
China is abolishing the Hukou system,3 and that the Hukou system is not functiona
On the contrary, scholars believe ‘the system is alive and well’. (Wang, 2004)  We 
also read many stories about the migrants’ plight and their struggle for equality and 
rights in city.  Therefore, one aim of this study is to reveal and explore inequality 
 
3 February 1994, Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post published an article entitled ‘‘Registration 
system set to be abolished’’ 
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under the Hukou system in recent years and to generate some inspiration for Hukou
reform. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW RETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Th
on
ces.  
.1 China’s Hukou (Household registration) system 
tration) system in a 
es of this 
le’s administrative registration to regulate 
t 
hnic, 
ted to register and then identify 
citiz ped 
 AND THEO
e purpose of this chapter is to synthesize existing theories, concepts and research 
 the Hukou system and inequality and to establish analytical guidelines for an 
exploration of the impact of Hukou system on inequalities in individual’s lif chan
 
2
  In this part I analyze China’s Hukou (Household regis
comparative perspective so as to see better the commonalities and peculiariti
system and its role in managing population and social control. 
 2.1.1 Residential Registration in comparative perspective 
   Residential registration in the West 
   The use of state power to compel peop
and restrict internal migration, and hence to fix population geographically has a long 
history. It is not exclusively a Chinese or a communist phenomenon. (Wang, 2005b) 
According to one nongovernmental international organization’s study in 2001, at leas
thirty-three nations around the world used nationally uniform identification cards 
based on the bearer’s location and residence in order to identify different racial, et
and religious characteristics and maintain rural-urban divisions with clear 
characteristics of discrimination. (Fussell, 2001) 
In the West, the Greeks and the Romans star
ens so as to clarify the rights and duties of every resident. The Romans develo
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tern 
as 
wentieth century, European nations once again began another round 
of pa
 
ns 
 
de 
re are perhaps only two major nations in the West, the United States and 
Aust
a national residential registration system, at first irregularly, during the republican era. 
(Crook, 1994)  Toward the end of the Middle Ages, there were already laws 
restricting internal migration and punishing unauthorized migrants aimed at 
consolidating control of the peasantry by the monarchies and nobility of Wes
Europe. Such efforts subsided only in the nineteenth century, when massive overse
colonization and early social welfare systems based on new taxes from prosperous 
new industrial economies began to alleviate the pressure caused by the floating 
surplus labour. 
In the late t
ssportization to allow easier internal migration and social control. By 1977, 
thirteen European Union (EU) nations mandated a national personal identification
card, to be inspected by police at any time, and the European Council was making 
efforts to standardize such personal identification cards. By the 1990s, all EU natio
except the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Luxembourg made registration of place of 
abode obligatory for all citizens and residents. (Matthews, 1993)  Contemporary 
residential registration in Western Europe is not run by the police, and people can 
register automatically, albeit often as a mandatory duty, wherever they live without
specific government approval. Such registration generally does not affect people’s 
rights or freedom to move either internally or even beyond national borders but insi
the EU. 
The
ralia, that have yet to require national registration and identification of their 
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, some 
on 
ial registration systems before modern times. 
 
se 
s. 
 the 
ism. 
citizens. But even there, the widespread use of driver’s licenses and perhaps more
important, Social Security Numbers, has served much the same purpose as 
identification based on location or residence. Until even as late as the 1970s
jurisdictions in the United Stated actually required the bearer’s race to be identified 
driver’s licenses as well.(Wang, 2005b) 
   Residential registration in Asia 
   Japan and Korea had their resident
Howland (2001) observes that Japanese residential registration rules, copied directly
from China’s Tang Dynasty, were quite strict in controlling internal migration and 
mobility among eight strictly divided social strata, also largely modeled after Chine
and Confucian ideals. After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan’s Law on Household 
Registration of 1871 instituted the practice of registering all Japanese citizens and 
residents, and commoners began for the first time to be recognized by family name
Garon (1997) has noted that the Japanese Household Registration system does not 
restrict internal migration, although it does appear to have affected Japan’s 
urbanization. During World War II, tight, effective social control, helped by
Household Registration system, significantly assisted Japan’s militarism and fasc
The modern Japanese household registration system is run by local governments with 
police assistance, and similar to the practices in the EU, although Japanese Household 
Registration law stipulates more restrictive registration requirements. In Korea, 
though an equivalent system exists, there isn’t much restriction via residential 
registration. 
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00) made an in-depth study on an equivalent system in Taiwan. During 
. After 
, 
 
r nations, but it has not 
tem implicates Foucault’s notion of bio-power, 
of 
   Wang (20
Japanese colonial rule (1895-1945), Taiwan was forced to alter traditional Chinese 
institutions and legal norms including the residential registration system. The 
Japanese enhanced the mutual responsibility system for their rule of the island
World War II, the defeated Republic of China government found its new home on the 
island in 1949 and quickly improved an already tight residential registration system to 
ensure effective control of the population and resources; even so, Taiwan’s residential 
registration system has had little impact on the internal migration on the island. The 
social control of Taiwan’s residential registration, however, lasted well into the 1990s
when the rapidly developing young democracy effectively reduced the intrusiveness 
of personal identification cards the better to protect people’s rights of privacy. (Chen,
1995) In the 2000s, Taiwan’s Household registration system has largely evolved into 
one similar to Japan’s, losing much of its traditional function.  
  In South Asia, residential registration exists in India and othe
nearly the power of the PRC Hukou system. Much of the control of internal migration 
and geographically based exclusion and discrimination takes place at the hands of 
non-state actors. (Wang, 2005b) 
  The residential registration sys
which was “without question an indispensable element in the development of 
capitalism”. (Foucault, 1976) According to Foucault, bio-power refers to "an 
explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations 
bodies and the control of populations." (Foucault, 1976) Bio-power plays an 
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 present at every 
s, operated in the 
ial 
 
  Residential registration before founding of the People’s Republic of China 
e 
jia 
 
 
to 
n 
 
na’s 
e 
important role in economic development and social segregation. 
They created in the eighteenth century as techniques of power
level of the social body and utilized by very diverse institution
sphere of economic processes. They also acted as factors of segregation and soc
hierarchization, exerting their influence on the respective forces of both these 
movements, guaranteeing relation of domination and effects of hegemony. 
(Foucault, 1976) 
 
   The household registration system has a long history in China, with the primitiv
forms of the institutions of household registration devised in the Western Zhou 
Dynasty (11th-8th century B.C.) Cheng (1994) believes that the Xiangsui and Bao
systems are the origins of PRC’s Hukou system. The rulers of Zhou Dynasty charged
a ministry to manage the population based on the well-defined family or clan structure
to record household registration annually and verify it triennially as the basis for 
taxation. A Xiangsui system organized families in the cities and the countryside in
two hierarchically structured networks. (Liu, 1988) When Qin finally unified China i
221 B.C., the Baojia system was adopted nationally, and the taxation and conscription 
functions of household registration were enhanced and expanded. Future social 
control mechanisms were built into the revised system. Everyone was required to
report residence, age, gender, and profession to the authorities. (Wang, 2005b) Chi
imperial household registration system inherited the characteristics of the Xiangsui 
and Baojia systems, and consistently functioned to allow for taxation and social 
control. It later acquired other important functions like land redistribution. For th
purpose of taxation and enhancing imperial rule, China’s household registration 
 
  13
 and divided ROC (Republic of 
 
n People’s Republic of China 
system, was restored in 
19
en, 
e 
n and management, requiring the registration of 
th
 
system evolved to become a thoroughly institutionalized and deeply legitimized 
tradition of Chinese political history. (Wang, 2005b) 
  Under the decaying Manchu regime and the chaotic
China), the imperial household registration system lost much of its role in migration 
control and taxation. Internal migration and emigration were accelerated. In the late 
Qing Dynasty (the last imperial dynasty) and the ROC, there were sporadic efforts by
various rulers and warlords to use the household registration system to increase tax 
revenues. (Wang, 2005b) 
2.1.2 The Hukou system i
  The PRC’s household registration system, the Hukou 
51 first to monitor movement and residence of urban populations, and further 
expanded to cover both the rural and urban populations in 1955. (Cheng and Seld
1994) The Regulation on Hukou Registration of the People’s Republic of China, and 
Regulation on Resident’s Personal Identification Card in the People’s Republic of 
China were promulgated separately on 9 January 1958 and 6 September 1985. Thes
two regulation and their implementation procedures are the main legal basis for the 
PRC Hukou system. (Wang, 2005a) 
Centering on population registratio
e place of residence with the public security agency, (Wu and Treiman, 2007) the 
Hukou system inherited many characteristics of the imperial household registration 
system. The peculiarities of the PRC’s Hukou system is that it divided the population
into“agricultural” and “nonagricultural” sectors (Wu and Treiman, 2007), and 
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n, the unit 
 
 
gions, 
ukou system came into existence alongside the creation of a planned 
ec cro 
e 
ustrial 
tions 
effectively regulated population flows between urban and rural areas. It requires every
Chinese citizen to be officially and constantly registered with the Hukou authority 
since birth, as the legal basis for personal identification. The categories of 
non-agricultural (urban) or agricultural (rural), the legal address and locatio
affiliation (employment), and a host of other personal and family information, 
including religious belief and physical features, are documented and verified to
become the person’s permanent Hukou record. (Wang, 2005a) The Hukou system
fundamentally touches and determines the life of every Chinese citizen, since it 
comprehensively collects data on everyone, identifies and stratifies people and re
controls population movement, and allocates resources and opportunities. (Wang, 
2005b) 
The H
onomy. Such an economy required meticulous planning of all macro and mi
facets of society. (Alexander and Chan, 2004) Through this system, two separate 
economic and social sub-systems and two populations were treated differently. Th
urban-industrial sub-system was given priority in access to resources while the 
rural/agricultural sub-system was to supply raw materials at low costs to the ind
sub-systems to maintain huge industrial profits. (Naughton, 1992) The Hukou system 
served as an administrative measure to contain the costs of urbanization in the process 
of rapid industrialization and maintain the imbalance of the two sub-systems, 
especially to prevent mobility from the countryside. (Chan, 1994) With food ra
and the numerous subsidies added later governing urban residents, the PRC Hukou 
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ed into 
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5a) 
.2 Hukou system and inequality 
lity under dual economic structure 
   dual 
system was related in crucial ways in resource allocation and the division of the urba
from the rural. (Wang, 2005a) Under this system, the majority of the population was 
confined to the countryside and entitled to few of the rights and benefits that the 
socialist state conferred to urban residents, such as permanent employment, medi
insurance, housing, pensions, and educational opportunities for children. (Wu and 
Treiman, 2004) Rural-to-urban status conversion has been very selective from the 
inception of the registration system. To control the growth of the urban population,
the government imposed a strict quota on the conversion rate, between 1.5 and 2.0 p
thousand persons each year, even in the reform era. (Lu 2003, pp. 144–46) 
As with the history of the People’s Republic of China, which can be divid
o stages - the pre-reform period or the Maoist period, from 1949 to 1978, and the 
period associated with the economic reforms that began in 1979 under Deng Xiaopin
and then continued to the present day - the Chinese Hukou system can also be divided 
into two stages: pre-reform period and reform period. The PRC’s Hukou system has 
been deeply affected by the economic reform, which has altered much of China’s 
institutional framework, but has so far largely survived the reform era. (Wang, 200
It still plays a significant role in China today. 
 
2
2.2.1 Hukou system and inequa
 Investigating the relation between Hukou system and inequality under
economic structure, the theory of “Lewis model” was applied in many studies. 
 
   About half a century ago, Arthur Lewis published his article, ‘Economic 
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 as 
Development with unlimited supplies of labor,’ which describes the modern
capitalist sectors as islands in a sea of low-skilled and unskilled labour in develo
countries. (Wang, 2005) The paper together with his subsequent writings gave rise to 
the famous ‘Lewis Growth Model,’ the hallmark of which is the assumption of a dual 
structure of the economy. (Islam and Yokota, 2008) According to the dual economy 
tradition of economic development models, less developed economies at an early 
stage of development are marked by a dichotomy between a modern sector, in whi
workers are hired at an institutional wage in numbers that rise with the growth of the 
industrial capital stock, and a traditional sector, in which workers subsist at an income
level that is somewhat below the industrial wage and is linked to their average rather 
than marginal productivity. (Putterman, 1992) The basic message of the above models
was: invest in modern industry and let the traditional surplus labour, cheap food and 
forced saving (through terms of trade manipulation) allow an urban, modern economy 
to grow. With investment favouring the urban, modern industrial economy, eventually,
the needed structural transformation will be realized. (Zhang, 2003 p12) Rostow 
defines this as a period of two or three decades during which the economy transfo
itself in such a way that economic growth becomes, subsequently, more or less 
automatic; its characteristics are a reduction of the rural proportion of the popula
a doubling of savings rates and the first marked and continuous flowering of industry 
stimulated by the availability of surplus labour. (Ranis and Fei, 1961) 
  Different terminologies have been used to express this dualism, such
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investigate the 
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ty. 
‘urban–rural,’ ‘capitalist–non capitalist,’ ‘modern–traditional,’ 
‘capitalist–subsistence,’ ‘industrial–agricultural’ and ‘commerci
Lewis himself started with the ‘capitalist–non-capitalist’ characterization of this 
duality, but later recognized the possibility of other characterizations. (Islam and 
Yokota, 2008) Two conditions need to be satisfied as preconditions for the emerge
of differences between the two sectors. The first is ‘abundance’ of labour (relative to 
other inputs, mainly land) in the traditional sector. The second is some restrictions tha
prevent a free flow of labour from the traditional to the modern sector, at least until 
the Lewis growth process starts. (Islam and Yokota, 2008) Zhang (2003) pointed out
that behind almost every aspect of China’s development lies the harsh reality of the 
‘Lewis model’ of economic development with unlimited supplies of labour. China ha
a huge population, totaling almost 1.3 billion. The population growth rate is still quite 
fast, adding an extra 15-16 million people each year to the total. From 1990-1999, 
China’s working age population rose from 679 million to 829 million, an increase o
no fewer than 150 million in less than a decade. Almost 70% of the Chinese 
population still lives in rural areas. Employment in the farm sector is stagnan
around 330 million. It is estimated that there are around 150 million ‘surplus’ farm
workers. This places a powerful constraint on the rate of growth of real incomes for 
low-skilled occupations in the non-farm sector. (Zhang, 2003) 
  The theory of dual structure of economy has been applied to 
relationship between the Hukou system and inequality. For example, Feiling W
(2005b) applied this theory to investigate the role of Hukou system in China’s socie
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He pointed out that there is a Hukou based institutional exclusion in China, which 
played significant role in a dual economy. Wang (2005 b, p19 ) observes that, “This
effective institutional exclusion, with implied regulation of internal and cross-sector 
migration, that allows needed talent and labour to move but stabilizes the 
nonproductive labour for as long as possible also creates a stable sociopoli
and a relatively orderly and desirable urban environment to attract foreign investors 
and merchants”. Wang (2005b, p19) notes, further, that, “This stable and effective 
institutional exclusion may provide remedies to a dual economy to allow for an 
accelerated economic growth and technological development”.  
The relationship between the dual economy, dual social structu
s been explored by many researchers. Cai Fang (2001) founded that the separate 
urban and rural labour markets in China took shape in close connection with the 
relevant systems; the Hukou system protected, to some extent, the employment of
urban labour but excluded rural labour. Some empirical studies are further of the 
opinion that Hukou-based differences exist in the relations between labour and cap
in the labour market; there are wide disparities between labourers who are urban 
residents and peasant labourers in wages, insurance and qualification for trade uni
membership, with Hukou being responsible for 30% of the disparities. (Lu, 2008) 
Mallee pointed out in her paper in 1995 that the Hukou system is a social institutio
which rigidly divides Chinese society into a rural and an urban segment. Kam Wing 
Chan also put forward in 1999 that the Hukou system contributes to the formation of 
dual society of rural and urban areas. In essence, the Hukou system acted very much 
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like a domestic passport system. On the one hand, it divided the population into two 
"castes," one (the non-agricultural population) economically and socially superior to 
the other (the agricultural population), with vastly different opportunities, obligations 
and socio-economic statuses. (Chan, 1996) On the other hand, while it could not 
totally control population movements, the system did create many obstacles to 
geographical - and social - mobility. It created a chasm in Chinese society and 
produced and reproduced social segregation and social disparity. In the pre-refo
the Hukou system produced many dire consequences at both societal and personal 
levels, amply documented in Cheng's research. (Chan, 1999) While economic duali
(agriculture/industry) is characteristic of most developing countries, the Chinese state 
has also produced a tenacious social dualism, through both economic and, more 
importantly, institutional means (such as the Hukou system). 
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        Figure 2.1 - Dual Economy and Dual Society in the Pre-reform Era 
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   From this perspective, scholars expl
the perspective of the gap between urban-rural areas and industrial-agricultural sector
whereby the Hukou system, as an institutional means, reinforces a dual economy and 
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dual structure. Hukou system is regarded as a central institutional mechanism defining
sectoral differentiation and restricting inter- and intra-sectoral obility. From this 
perspective, most studies are concerned with the impact of the institution on econ
performance at the aggregate level, while the impact of Hukou system on individuals’ 
lives was neglected in these studies. 
 
2
 Hukou system significantly affects personal life in many respe
holar, Yiyong Peng (1994) concluded that the Hukou system has been “affixing
people’s social career, role, personal identity, production training”. Research has b
conducted to investigate the effect of the Hukou system based on individuals having 
different Hukou status, focusing especially on the impact of Hukou system on labour 
market, life chances, and intergenerational occupational mobility. Most researchers 
conducted empirical research to measure the association between the Hukou system 
and life chances, occupational attainment, labour market returns, and intergeneration
occupational mobility to claim that the Hukou system played an important part in 
fostering inequalities between rural and urban residents. 
  Among the research on the labour market in urban C
equalities in occupational attainment and labour market returns are heated. These 
empirical studies have provided significant evidence of the existence of inequality in
occupational attainment and labour market returns. In Western nations, in which 
‘ascribed’ attributes such as sex and race have considerable effects on individual’
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Compared with urban residents, China is no exception to the occupational 
concentration of temporary migrants to cities found in other Asian countries. An 
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labour market position and returns independent of their achieved attributes, (Fan, 
2001) while in China, the occupational attainment and labour-market returns are in
addition heavily influenced by residence status or the Hukou status. 
Yang and Guo (1996, p. 771), in their study of occupational attain
ban temporary economic migrants in China, 1985-1990, using multinomial logistic 
regression to analyze a one percent sample of the 1990 census data of China, found 
that, 
overwhelming majority of the rural to urban temporary economic migrants 
entered cities to work in the industrial and tertiary sectors. In the industrial 
sector, they were more likely to work in those occupations which were 
physically demanding, required low skill, and were potentially hazardous. In
tertiary sector, over half were private retailers in sales business, and a la
proportion of them served in restaurants or as housemaids in the service sector.  
e tasks in which the temporary workers are engaged are typically those which 
ban permanent residents are unwilling or unable to do. (Yang and Guo, 1996) Guo
and Iredale (2004) further studied this question by analyzing the impact of Hukou 
status on migrants’ employment. Using data from 1997 Beijing Migrant Census, Fe
Guo and Robyn Iredale made the comparison of occupational structures of Beijing 
local residents and migrants using a logistic regression analysis method to measure 
the determinants of migrants’ access to jobs in the formal and informal sectors. The 
author concluded that although education, especially higher education, plays a very 
important role in the occupational attainment for migrants, migrants’ access to jobs i
the formal sector in Beijing is still determined by institutional factors, such as Hukou. 
(Guo and Iredale, 2004) Based on a one percent sample of China's 1990 Census, 
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Huanag (2001) presents an empirical study of occupational attainment of female 
migrants in China, which shows that female migrants are at a disadvantage in the 
labour market not only because of their gender but also because of their rural 
identities and outsider status, as defined by the Hukou system. They can only a
jobs with lower prestige than their male counterparts.  
In the area of labour market returns, whereas recent s
nder wage gaps and labour market segmentation by sex, (Maurer-Fazio et al, 1
Yang and Guo, 1996) Fan’s (2001) study focuses specifically on resident status. 
Based on a survey in Guangdong in 1998, through examining the variations in inc
and benefits returns among non-migrant urban residents, permanent migrants who 
possess urban residence, and temporary migrants who are denied permanent residen
rights in cities, Fan (2001) points out that permanent migrants' income returns are 
especially high and that temporary migrants' benefits returns are especially inferior
By using multiple regression and logistic regression to measure the determinants of 
income and benefit returns, the results show that residence status is the most 
influential independent variable. These findings suggest that the urban labour
in China is segmented by resident status, and that this segmentation has brought about
differential returns to urban non-migrants, permanent migrants, and temporary 
migrants in the labour force. (Fan, 2001) The findings also support the notion th
China resident status functions like ascribed attributes that have effects on 
labour-market returns independent of achieved attributes. (Fan, 2001)  
  Through examining the effects of Hukou origin on access to education
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credentials, two significant facilitators of social mobility in state socialist China 
Xiaogang Wu and Donald Treiman (2004) claim that rural Hukou status imposed
additional limitations on favorable life chances in China. People of rural and urban
origins differ substantially in their access to educational and political opportunities 
that may help them move upward in the socialist hierarchy. (Wu and Treiman, 2004
Zhiqiang Liu observes a similar finding. Using data from Chinese Household Income 
Project 1995, Liu (2005) found that people who obtained urban Hukou late in their 
lives had fewer years of education and fared significantly less well than other urban
residents. 
  In the ar
and intergenerational occupational mobility”, Xiaogang Wu and Donald Treiman 
(2007) investigated the puzzling question concerning the apparent lack of 
intergenerational occupational reproduction. Some researchers (e.g., Parish
Blau and Ruan, 1990) claim that China, as a state socialist country, is usually open.
The linkage between father’s and son’s occupational status was weakened, resulting 
in an unusually low level of social reproduction. Other scholars, by contrast, claim 
that intergenerational status transmission did exist under socialism. They pointed to 
the role of urban workplace in weakening occupational transmission. Lin and Bian 
(1991) argued that despite a weak and insignificant association between father’s and
son’s occupational status, father’s work-unit status had a direct and significant effect 
on son’s work unit status. Xiaogang Wu (2007) pointed out that the usual “openness” 
in the current urban population can be explained by China’s distinctive population 
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registration system, which simultaneously fails to protect rural-origin men from 
downward mobility and permits only the best educated to attain urban registratio
status. 
  Thes
existing inequalities in individuals’ life chances and experiences .However, the data 
adopted by these researchers is drawn from surveys conducted in recent years, so tha
the results only reflect conditions in the reform era with no reference to inequalities in 
individuals’ lives in the pre-reform era. 
 
2
This thesis studies the inequ
 its impact on individual lives among two groups of people—agricultural (rural) and 
non-agricultural (urban). The resource allocation based on different Hukou statuses 
and the process and determinants of Hukou status conversion are examined to indica
the inequality between rural and urban residents. As reviewed earlier, the Hukou 
system produced many dire consequences at both societal and personal levels (Ch
1999). In studying the relation between the Hukou system and inequality under dual 
structure, past research interest lies primarily with understanding how the Hukou 
system creates, reinforces, and solidifies the inequality between industrial and 
agricultural sectors and urban and rural areas. Within this perspective, these stu
largely ignore individuals’ lives. In studying the Hukou system and individual 
inequality, empirical research is conducted by many scholars to explain these 
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inequalities with respect to factors such as employment, income, education, lif
chances, and intergenerational mobility. This perspective provides remarkable 
evidence of the influence of the Hukou system on the existing inequalities in an
individual’s life chances and experiences .However, the data adopted by previou
research are drawn from surveys conducted in recent years, so the results only refle
conditions in the reform era with no reference to inequalities that may be based on 
different Hukou statues at the individual level in the pre-reform era.  
   In studying the impact of the Hukou system on inequalities in indiv
research develops an analytic framework containing two major dimensions: resource 
allocation and Hukou status conversion. I argue that with the state’s ability to allocate
resources inequitably and strictly control opportunities for mobility, the Hukou system 
created and solidified inequalities among an individual’s life chances and experiences. 
    In the pre-reform era, resources were allocated unevenly between the two 
categories of agricultural and non-agricultural populations, as will be detailed in
Chapter 4. The urban residents’ needs of daily life were guaranteed by national la
As early as 1951, the state council issued its directive to establish the regulation of 
labour insurance for the purpose of “protecting workers’ health and lessening their 
living difficulties” (Bureau of Policies and Regulations, 1990). This regulation 
covered on-the-job injuries, sick leave, retirement funds, and maternity leave, am
other items. It applied to all firms with more than one hundred employees, including 
state firms, collective firms, hybrid firms, and private firms in major industries (Zhou
2004). The distribution of benefits and resources in reality is confined to urban 
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residents, while rural China has been largely excluded from the central planning
redistribution. Rural residents were supposed to be self-sufficient. An enormous gap 
between rural residents and urban residents remains in the reform era. 
  The uneven distribution of resources was not the only way by which
individual lives were produced through the Hukou system. The state, by creating 
many obstacles to geographical and social mobility, strictly controlled access to 
opportunities for rural residents to migrate to the city and enjoy the subsidies sup
by the state to urban residents. The Hukou system thereby created a chasm in Chinese 
society and produced and reproduced social segregation and social inequality. 
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CHAPTER 3  
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter is concerne ological approaches to the study of 
in
ework, this study is intended to interpret the 
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.1 Documentary Data 
about Hukou system are from the government regulation 
3) 
d mainly with method
equality between rural and urban residents’ lives under Hukou system. I will answer 
the research questions by using two types of data: qualitative data based on 
government documents, and quantitative data based on the China General Social 
Survey. That is to say, a combined quantitative and qualitative methodology will be 
used to conduct an empirical study. 
  As designed in the theoretical fram
inequality under Hukou system from the two aspects of resource allocation and 
opportunity for Hukou status conversion in both the pre-reform and reform eras.
Qualitative data from government documents is adopted to explore inequalities in
resource allocation and Hukou status conversion in pre-reform era, and quantitative
data from the China General Survey 2003 is employed to explore the correlation 
between Hukou type and resource allocation and the determinants of the Hukou st
conversion from rural to urban in the reform era.  
 
3
  The documentary data 
which can be found in Compilations of PRC Public Security Regulations (1957-199
 
 and Reference Materials on the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China. These 
two sources usually contain the regulations and policy on the resource allocation and 
Hukou status conversion. 
  The regulations on the resource allocation include: State Council, Guanyu shizhen 
liangshi dingliang gongying zanxing banfa (Interim Measures for Rationed Supply of 
Grain in Cities and Towns), issued on 25 August 1955; State Council, Guanyu jiuye 
wenti de jueding (Decision on the problem of employment), issued in 1952; 
Administration Council, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong baoxian tiaoli，
(Provisional regulation of the People's Republic of China on Labour Insurance) 
issued in February 1951. The regulations on the allocation of grain, food, employment, 
housing, social security between rural and urban residents were examined to indicate 
the inequality in resource allocation under hukou system. 
  The regulations on the Hukou status conversion include: Chengshi Hukou guanli 
zanxing tiaoli (Interim Regulations on Urban Household Administration) issued on 16 
July 1951 by the Ministry of Public Security; the Hukou dengji zanxing banfa (canan) 
(Provisional measures for Hukou registration (draft)) issued in 1955 by Ministry of 
Internal Affairs; Ministry of Public Security, Guanyu chuli Hukou qianyi wenti de 
tongzhi(Circular Concerning the Regulations of Transfer of Hukou Registration), 
issued on 17 April 1962; Ministry of Public Security, Guanyu jiaqiang Hukou dengji 
gongzuo de yijian (Suggestions Concerning the Reinforcement of Hukou 
administration), issued on 8 December 1962; Ministry of Public Security, Guanyu 
chuli hukou qianyi de guiding (The Regulations of Transfer of Hukou registration), 
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 issued on 8 November 1977; Decree of the Present of the People’s Republic of China, 
the Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hukou dengji tiaoli (Regulations on Household 
Registration in the People’s Republic of China) issued on 9 January 1958. From these 
regulations, the factors of the control mechanism, channels, the qualification and the 
document needed for Hukou status conversion were examined to indicate how the 
majority of rural residents was excluded from the city. 
  However, one problem arises when using the document to examine the inequality in 
resource allocation between rural and urban residents. Through the regulation, we can 
only get the information about how the resources are allocated between the rural and 
urban residents in pre-reform era, but we can’t get the exact extent of the 
differentiations in the resource between these two groups of people.   
  As Wang (2005) pointed out, the PRC Hukou system was a semi-secret institution 
and data needed for ascertaining causal relations are often incomplete, hidden, or 
simply nonexistent. In the absence of systematic and complete data, for the studies of 
the pre-reform era, qualitative data from original policy documents serve as the only 
means to identify the differences in resource allocation and channels and qualification 
for Hukou conversion. At the same time, under the planned economy in the 
pre-reform era, the running of economy and society was strictly controlled and 
regulated by the Chinese state’s polices and regulations. Resource allocation and 
Hukou status conversion can be studied systematically by analyzing qualitative data 
from government documents. 
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   The initial analysis of qualitative data shows a variety of factors that are crucial for 
Hukou status conversion; based on that, the hypotheses that guide quantitative study 
can be designed to interpret whether the factors which influenced the Hukou status 
conversion in the pre-reform era still play important roles at present. Qualitative data 
can also provide further demonstration and explanation of the results of qualitative 
analysis.  
 
3.2 Quantitative Data 
In the reform era, data from China General Social Survey 2003 will be employed to 
examine the differentiation between urban Hukou status and rural Hukou status in 
resource allocation and the factors that influence the Hukou status conversion.  
The China General Social Survey 2003 was conducted by the Department of 
Sociology in Renmin University of China and Center of Social Research in The Hong 
Kong University of Science and Technology with financial support from “211 
Project” and the RGC (the Research Grants Council) in Hong Kong. The CGSS 
program gathers data on series of subjects in social changes in order to form a 
continuing and open platform for social research. The CGSS2003 is available at the 
Department of Sociology in Renmin University of China for any teachers or students 
who contact with them. The topic of CGSS2003 is social stratification, social mobility 
and social network. 
The size of the sample for CGSS2003 was 5,894. The sample was selected from 
Fifth National Census in 2000: first, residents’ committees were randomly selected in 
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 cities and towns throughout the country (except Xinjiang, Tibet and Qinghai), then 
investigators used the equidistant sampling method to select household samples from 
the household registers of the committees. On arriving at the households, the 
investigators used the random sampling form to determine interviewees and conduct 
questionnaire interviews. 5900 respondents were selected from 28 cities, 92 districts 
and counties, and 590 residents committees. The survey ultimately got 5,894 effective 
questionnaire forms.  
The questionnaire of CGSS 2003 has the following sections: A. Household 
members, B. Personal information, C. Changes in hukou registration, D. Family 
information, E. Social communication, F. Education background, G. Professional 
experiences, H. Condition of obtaining current job, I. Evaluation, J. Behavior and 
attitude.  
One of the characteristics of this survey is that it not only contains information on 
Hukou status of respondents’ and their family members but also has a section (section 
C) on the changes in Hukou registration, which make the data from this survey 
well-suited for this study. The distribution of the interviewees’ Hukou was as follows 
(see Table 3.1): 
 
 
 
 
 
 32
 
  
Table 3.1 - The distribution of interviewees’ Hukou 
Hukou hierarchy    No. of people   Percentage   Effective      Cumulative 
Percentage%     percentage % 
                 
Municipality         950          16.1        16.1            16.1 
Provincial          1450          24.6        24.6            40.7 
 Capital city 
Prefecture-level city  1328          22.5         22.5           63.3 
County-level city    1130          19.2         19.2            82.4 
Town              602          10.2          10.2           92.7 
Village             433          7.3            7.3          100.0 
Missing            1 
Total             5894           100.0          100.0 
Source: Lu (2008) 
  The main limitation of employing the data from CGSS 2003 in this study is that the 
survey was conducted in urban areas. The comparison between rural Hukou holders 
and urban Hukou holders was limited to comparison between urban residents and 
floating population, the majority rural Hukou holders in rural area are not included in 
the study.  
  Using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software, crosstab 
analysis and logistic regression were used for the various scales analysis. In order to 
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 indicate the existing inequality in resource allocation between different Hukou holders, 
crosstab analysis were applied to measure the correlation between Hukou type and 
monthly income, provision of basic medical care, basic old-age insurance, housing or 
housing benefit and management level. Logistic regression was applied to measure 
the factors influence the odds of Hukou status conversion. 
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CHAPTER 4 
   THE HUKOU SYSTEM AND INEQUALITY IN THE PRE-REFORM ERA 
   Based on a comprehensive review of regulations and policy documents, this 
chapter first examines the Hukou system in the context of a planned economy and 
then elaborates on the inequality under the Hukou system in the pre-reform era from 
two aspects: resource allocation and Hukou status conversion. 
 
4.1 Hukou system in the pre-reform era 
  The process of state control over rural-to-urban migration operated within a 
multi-layer structure. While the Hukou system was the primary administrative means, 
multiple institutions were integrated into the process.  
4.1.1 The Hukou system in the context of a planned economy 
   To be able to understand this system, we must first take a glance at its history and 
the era in which the system was born. 
Faced with an agrarian economy with insufficient capital in its early days, the 
Chinese government adopted the Soviet model to put a high priority on heavy industry 
to speed up its industrialization (Chan, 1999) and to introduce the planned economy. 
The planned economy required meticulous planning of all macro and micro facets of 
society, from industrial policies specifying where to allocate the country’s resources, 
down to what we would consider as the most personal of everyday affairs, such as the 
daily amount of foods consumed (Alexander & Chan, 2004). Under the "forging 
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 ahead" or heavy-industry oriented development strategy, government acquired funds 
needed in developing the heavy industry via the scissors gap between the prices of 
industrial and agricultural products. In the 1950s and 1960s, under the international 
situation of the Cold War, access to loans from other nations was limited, if not 
nonexistent. Thus, another means had to be found to solve the problem of 
insufficiency of funds in industrialization; the solution depended on accumulation 
from agricultural surplus. To be more specific, the government bought low-price 
agricultural products monopolistically, which it later sold to the workers at a low price 
so that labour costs could be cut. Meanwhile, the government acquired extra profits by 
raising the prices of industrial products, thus ensuring the demand for funds needed to 
develop heavy industry as a top priority.  
As a capital-intensive industry, heavy industry has a fairly limited capacity for 
labour. Consequently, surplus labourers in rural areas could not be transferred during 
the process of industrialization. The government was prompted to adopt 
administrative approaches to confine these surplus labourers in agricultural production. 
Moreover, the price gap in the exchange of industrial and agricultural products 
ensured that merely a fraction of people, the urban residents with their salaries as the 
main source of income, could enjoy the benefit of low-price agricultural products. The 
state also assumed the responsibility of providing jobs (Chan, 1999) and offered 
various subsidies in housing, medical care, grain, and education for all urban residents 
in the priority urban-industrial sector. However, due to limited financial resources, 
only a meager number of people enjoyed such subsidies. To maintain such an artificial 
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 imbalance under the condition of a dual economy, the state had to find a mechanism 
to block the free flow of resources (including labour) between industry and agriculture, 
and between city and country (Chan, 1999). The implementation of the Hukou system 
reduced the number of people enjoying the advantage of low-priced agricultural 
products (i.e., urban residents) to a minimum. Thereafter, industrial costs were 
reduced and the pressure on the employment, supply of life necessities, housing, 
transportation and public facilities, urban grain and oil supply could all be relieved. 
The Hukou system was one of the important means for setting up and maintaining 
such a social and economic configuration in the pre-reform era (Chan, 1999). As 
Mallee (1995) pointed out, the Hukou system played the role of an instrument of 
development policy, aimed at keeping urban populations small while fostering 
industrial development. 
The Hukou system’s effectiveness in regulating migration did not come from just 
the system itself but from its integration with other social and economic control 
mechanisms (Chan, 1999). Particularly in the pre-reform period, formal migration 
operated within a political and economic environment in which economic activities 
were strictly controlled by the bureaucratic system (Chan, 1999). The first of these 
mechanisms was central control over employment. On the rural side, the commune 
system enabled local governments to bind peasants to the land. All adults in 
communes had to participate in agricultural production (Parish & Whyte 1978), and 
migration was generally prohibited except with the permission of local government. 
On the urban side, the principal administrative units for most urban residents were the 
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 workplace organizations (danwei) (Bian, 1994; Walder, 1986; Wu, 2002). And 
because employment quotas in all urban work units were tightly controlled by the 
government’s labour administration (Walder, 1986), even rural migrants who left their 
home villages would have little chance of getting jobs in cities (Wu, 2004).  
The second mechanism related to the enforcement of the registration rules was the 
ration system and coupon system that supplied daily commodities, especially staple 
foods (Mallee, 1995). Under the ration system, basic staples such as grain, meat, 
cooking oil, sugar, and cotton could be bought only in state-run stores using ration 
certificates or coupons that were distributed in cities to local residents with an urban 
Hukou. Rural residents were excluded from the ration system and were expected to be 
self-sufficient in food (Liu, 2005). Over the course of the 1950s, the state 
monopolized the distribution of virtually all goods, and most free markets disappeared. 
The peasants grew their own food, of course, but state procurement left them with 
little more than a bare minimum, and that again was allocated on the basis of team 
membership (Chan, 1999). On the rural side, all adults received food rations from 
their commune, while on the urban side, the work unit administered most social 
services for their employees. Without a work unit, it was difficult to survive in a city 
because housing, food, and other social services were hardly available through the 
market (Wu, 2004). These goods, or coupons with which to buy them, could be 
obtained only on the basis of legal residence (registration) in an area. Thus, both in the 
countryside and in the cities, the ability to obtain most essential goods depended on 
residence in a certain place where there was access to the rationing system, and with it, 
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 the possibility of staying somewhere during periods of relative scarcity; however, it 
was very hard to survive outside one’s home area (Mallee, 1995).Overall, the Hukou 
system worked with other mechanisms to form a multi-layered web of control. Each 
institution administered one or more aspects of rural-urban migration, but they were 
all interrelated and complementary to each other (Chan, 1999).  
Figure 4.1 illustrates the relationship between the institutions in pre-reform era. 
 
                       Figure 4.1 Institutions in the Pre-Reform Era 
 
 
4.1.2 Establishment of the Hukou system 
Using 1995 as the cut-off point of the pre-reform era (the year that the “Directive 
Concerning Establishment of a Permanent System of Household Registration” was 
promulgated), the Chinese Hukou system can be divided into two stages.  
The first stage, from 1949-1955, is the free domiciliary transfer stage and also the 
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 preparatory period for the Hukou system. Although laws guaranteed the right of free 
migration, several policies were enacted to monitor population movement. A plethora 
of freedoms and rights were guaranteed in the Common Programme, issued at the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in 1949, and acted as China's de 
facto constitution until the National People's Congress ratified the first formal 
constitution in 1954. Article 5 stipulated that: "The people of the People's Republic of 
China shall have freedom of thought, speech, publication, assembly, association, 
correspondence, person, domicile, moving from one place to another, religious belief 
and the freedom to hold processions and demonstration” (Selden, 1979). Article 90 of 
the 1954 constitution similarly guaranteed people "freedom of residence and freedom 
to change their residence" (Selden, 1979). In this period, China's urban population 
increased from 10.6% of the total population in 1949 to 14.6% in 1956, with a net 
gain of 34.6 million. Rural migrants accounted for 19.8 million of the total increase 
(Kirkby, 1985). Throughout the early 1950s, in the honeymoon years of the People's 
Republic, free movement into and out of cities and throughout the countryside 
facilitated economic recovery, restoration of trade, and social healing after a century 
of political disintegration, protracted foreign invasion, and civil war (Cheng, 1994). At 
the same time, the unemployment problem in urban China became serious. 
  In the years 1953 to 56, the transformation from private and capitalist ownership to 
state and collective ownership of agriculture, industry, handicrafts, and commerce was 
basically completed (Cheng, 1994). By the end of 1956, 97% of rural households had 
joined co-operatives, including 88% in large collectives of the Soviet type. At the 
 40
 
 same time, over 74,000 handicraft co-operatives were set up, including six million 
craft workers—92% of the total number of such workers (Selden, 1993). By 1956, 
68% of factories had been nationalized and the remainder were classified as joint 
state-private enterprises. This effectively brought all industry and virtually all 
commerce within the orbit of state control (Cheng, 1994). By the end of 1956, the 
production and residence in both urban and rural areas was under state control. 
Meanwhile, the state exerted more control over population movement. 
  On 16 July 1951, the Ministry of Public Security, with State Council Approval, 
issued "Regulations Governing the Urban Population.” The regulations were a 
nationwide mechanism to monitor urban population movement and residence, both 
short- and long-term. For example, visitors of three days or longer were required to 
register with a public security sub-station (Article 6), and hospital and hotel residents 
were similarly registered (Article 7). Significantly, responsibility for registration and 
control were vested in the public security bureau. On 17 April 1953, the State Council 
promulgated a "Directive on Dissuading Peasants from Blind Influx into Cities," 
referring above all to the largest cities. The directive, using persuasive language, 
urged the hundreds of thousands of peasants who had entered the cities in search of 
work to return to their villages (Cheng, 1994). On 31 December 1954, the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress promulgated the "Regulations for 
Public Security Substations." It mandated municipal and county public security 
bureaus to set up substations in areas under their jurisdiction. On the same day, the 
National People's Congress promulgated the "Organic Regulations of Urban Street 
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 Offices." By then, all the preparatory work for establishing a national Hukou system 
had been completed. 
  Having consolidated institutions for police-administrative control over population 
movement, on 22 June 1955, the State Council passed "The Directive Concerning 
Establishment of a Permanent System of Household Registration." The Hukou system 
entered its second stage from 1955 to 1978—the controlled domiciliary transfer stage. 
The 1955 regulations inaugurated the shift in emphasis from the use of Hukou for 
registration purposes to state policies that prevented or slowed short-term and 
long-term migration (Cheng, 1994). On 9 January 1958, the Standing Committee of 
the NPC promulgated the "Regulations on Household Registration in the People's 
Republic of China.” Freedom of residence and movement had long since disappeared 
from the list of state-guaranteed rights and they would not be restored in the decades 
of mobilizational collectivism that lay ahead. The 1958 regulations extended 
registration provisions to the People's Liberation Army (Article 3). Every Chinese 
citizen was now included in the Hukou system. 
  The Hukou system and associated state controls on jobs, housing, rations, and travel 
made possible the widening urban-rural spatial inequalities of income. 
4.2 Resource allocation based on different Hukou status in the pre-reform era 
Historically, redistribution, or the allocation of resources through a centralized 
authority, has been a distinctive mode of economic institutions (Polanyi, 1965). It 
evolved into its full-fledged form in the Soviet-type state socialist societies, where 
almost all resources were subject to allocation by the state (Zhou, 2004). Through 
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 examining the redistribution system, and more specifically, how resources were 
allocated in both rural and urban areas, we can find out the different socioeconomic 
eligibility between agricultural and non-agricultural Hukou. Table 4.1 highlights the 
difference in socioeconomic eligibility between the agricultural Hukou and the 
non-agricultural Hukou in the pre-reform period. 
 Table 4.1 Comparison of Socioeconomic Eligibility before the Economic Reform: 
              Agricultural Hukou vs. Non-agricultural Hukou 
 Agricultural Hukou  Non-Agricultural Hukou 
Basic Foods 
(grain, 
cooking oil, 
meat, etc.) 
· Foods were mainly self-produced 
and food consumption depended 
on productivity 
· The state assumed responsibility to 
assure subsistence only in the 
event of unusual natural disasters  
·Basic foods were provided by 
the state through official retail 
outlets at subsidized prices 
·Food supply was rationed with 
low quality, consumption 
level depended on occupation 
as well as the administrative 
status of the city 
 
 
 
 
Employment 
· A major form of employment was 
collective farming 
· Obtaining urban-based jobs was 
subject to official permission with 
limited chances 
·Jobs were assigned by the state
·The position was lifetime 
secured 
·Job changes were subject to 
official permission 
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 · Temporary urban jobs were 
available through contracts 
between urban enterprises and 
agricultural collectives 
Income · Income was paid by the rhythm of 
the agricultural cycle and 
distributed in kind and cash 
· Income level depended on 
productivity and state purchasing 
prices 
·Income was paid monthly in 
cash 
·Income level was low but 
guaranteed 
Housing · Rural housing was privately owned 
and private-responsible 
· Housing land was collectively 
owned and assigned to private use 
·Urban housing was mainly 
state or collective owned 
·The state or collective would 
rent housing at nominal rents 
·Housing was in short supply 
and living conditions were 
poor 
Right for 
Urban 
Residence 
· It was denied without authorized 
permission 
·It was entitled only in the 
designated town or city 
Social · Medical insurance was very ·Health insurance and pension 
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 Security limited, depending on the local 
collective. 
· There was no pension scheme and 
care for the aged was the 
responsibility of family members 
were provided by the 
government or enterprises 
·It was enterprise-based 
·Degree of security was based 
on types of ownership 
Level of 
State 
Guarantee 
· State obligation was lower, level of 
living guarantee was based on the 
collective/community 
responsibility system 
·State obligation was higher, 
level of living guarantee was 
based on the state or 
collective responsibility 
system 
(Source: Zhang, 2004) 
  
4.3 Hukou status conversion in the pre-reform era 
  Hukou conversion and the corresponding process of converting Hukou status from 
agricultural to non-agricultural was the key to entering the institutionally “walled” 
cities (Zhang, 1994). Population migration was strictly controlled and peasants were 
shackled to the land, thereby sealing their fate. 
  4.3.1 The regulation of Hukou status conversion 
  The basic law of the PRC Hukou system in the Regulation on Household 
Registration (Hukou) of the People’s Republic of China of 1958, stated: 
     ARTICLE 10：Citizen migration out of a Hukou zone: the citizen or household 
head applies for out-migrant registration to the Hukou agencies and claims 
migration documents; the original Hukou is canceled. 
       Citizen migrating from the countryside to cities must have proof of 
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 employment from urban labor agencies, proof of admission from schools, or 
proof of in-migrant permission from urban Hukou registration agencies. 
Article 16 further stipulates: 
    Citizens leaving the permanent place of residence for personal reasons and living 
temporarily elsewhere for longer than three months must apply for extension [of 
temporary residence] or migration; those with no reason to extend and not 
qualified to relocate should return to their permanent place of residence. (Wang, 
1989) 
 This additional requirement for rural-to-urban migration later developed into a legal 
Great Wall separating the majority of the Chinese in the countryside from the minority 
in the cities (Wang 2005) Chinese citizens thus became divided into two segments: 
rural and urban Hukou holders. 
   
  4.3.2 Conversion of Hukou status from non-agricultural to agricultural  
  Conversion of Hukou status from non-agricultural to agricultural is mostly 
politically-determined forms of migration.   
In the economic crash of the early 1960s, the gap between the urban side and rural 
side widened as access to state-sector jobs and regular urban work of any kind was 
virtually closed to rural members. In the early 1960s, for the first and only time in the 
history of the People’s Republic, not even state jobs were secure. In the years 1961 to 
1964, the state responded to nationwide famine and the budget crisis by laying off 
twenty million state workers and sending them back to the countryside, including both 
recent migrants to the city and many who had been employed for a decade or more 
(Selden, 1993). Net migration from city to countryside was 13.9 million in 1962 and 
20.3 million in 1964 (Kirkby, 1985, p. 114). These workers lost not only their jobs on 
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 the state payroll, but their urban residence permits as well. Most found themselves 
permanently consigned to the countryside (Selden, 1993). The burden of assuring 
their subsistence shifted from the urban to the rural communities. 
   From the 1960s, even children of urban state-sector personnel faced extreme 
difficulty in obtaining state jobs and retaining urban residence. The persistent job 
shortage in the state sector, intensified by the cresting wave of urban youth entering 
the job market from the late 1960s, was a critical factor that led the state to send 
seventeen million urban high school and junior high school graduates to settle 
permanently in the countryside in the decade after 1966. The layoffs of workers in the 
early 1960s and the “downward” transfer of urban youth to the countryside 
dramatically reinforced the urban-rural and industry-agricultural divide between those 
who enjoy state’s grain and those who grew their own (Selden, 1993). 
  Faced with economic, demographic, and employment crises, the state transferred 
the fiscal burden to the countryside (Liu, 1984). An extreme instance of this was food 
consumption in the disaster years that followed the Great Leap Forward. While urban 
grain consumption dropped from 236 kilograms per person in 1954 to a tight 180 in 
1961, consumption by rural people who grew the grain fell from a high of 205 
kilograms in 1956 to 1957 to famine levels of 154-161 kilograms in the years 1961 to 
1964 (Taylor, 1986). 
   From the early 1960s, sectoral position became irrevocable: one could change 
residence or accept a job at a lower point in the locational and sectoral hierarchy, but 
it was virtually impossible to move to a higher position in the hierarchy (Selden, 
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 1993). 
  4.3.3 Conversion of Hukou status from agricultural to non-agricultural 
An approval process for converting Hukou status from agricultural to 
non-agricultural reflected the fact that while the Hukou system played an important 
role in restricting the flow of people from rural to urban sectors, there were other 
significant factors involved (Zhang, 1994).  
Dual classification of Hukou registration. For all PRC nationals, personal status 
under the rules of Hukou registration was defined in terms of two categories: one by 
settlement type and one by socioeconomic eligibility. The first classification was that 
of the “Hukou suozaidi” (the place of Hukou registration) (Chan & Zhang, 1999). It 
was based on one’s presumed place of permanent residence. The most common 
subcategories of the place of Hukou registration were urban centres (cities at different 
administrative levels and designated towns) or rural settlements (villages or state 
farms). The regular local Hukou registration defined one’s rights with regard to 
economic and social activities in a specified locality (Chan & Zhang, 1999). 
  The second classification was the “Hukou leibie” (the type or “status” of Hukou 
registration), essentially referred to as the “agricultural” as opposed to the 
“non-agricultural” Hukou. This classification was used to determine one’s entitlement 
to state-subsidized food, grain, and other prerogatives. The Hukou leibie originated 
from the occupational divisions of the 1950s, but later on as the system evolved, the 
“agricultural” and “non-agricultural” distinction bore no necessary relationship to the 
actual occupation of the holders, but to their socioeconomic eligibility and distinctive 
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 relationships with the state (Zhang, Q., 1994).  
  The dual classification scheme produced several impacts on migration. Change 
of one’s Hukou registration was far from a matter of personal choice. Any move from 
one location to another required individuals to go through a process of seeking 
approvals from various government departments (SC, 1958). A move within any 
Hukou category was generally subject to registration if that move went from a 
settlement with a higher administrative status to one with a lower status. A move 
crossing the Hukou category or going up from a settlement with a lower 
administrative level to one with a higher level was subject to control (MPS, 1962a; 
1962b). A move from a rural agricultural category to urban non-agricultural one 
required a corresponding dual approval process: changing the regular Hukou 
registration place and converting the Hukou status from agricultural to 
non-agricultural. The latter was an important process commonly known as 
“nongzhuanfei” in China. To change the regular Hukou registration locale, the 
applicant needed to present appropriate documents to the public security authorities to 
obtain a migration permit. In the case of nongzhuanfei, one had to satisfy the 
qualifications stipulated by the state and go through official channels. The granting of 
full urban residence status was often contingent upon the successful completion of 
nongzhuanfei, the core of the Hukou conversion process (Chan and Zhang, 1999). 
  Dual control mechanism. The key to regulating rural-to-urban migration was to 
control the Hukou status from agricultural to non-agricultural, which was subject to 
both “policy” (zhengce) control and “quota” (zhibiao) control. The policy control 
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 defined the qualifications of people entitled to non-agricultural Hukou, whereas the 
quota control regulated the number of qualified people who were assigned 
non-agricultural Hukou. In order to be eligible for nongzhuanfei, a person first had to 
satisfy the conditions set out in the policy control criteria while obtaining a space 
under the quota control at the same time. If one fulfilled the former criterion but did 
not have a space, he or she would not be able to succeed with conversion of Hukou 
status. The way the system worked was somewhat similar to the experience of 
international migrants trying to get visa permits in many countries. Therefore, through 
both policy control and quota control, the state regulated the kinds of people and the 
number it wanted to admit into the urban areas at any given time. 
  The categories of conversion of Hukou status under the special channel were 
defined by ad hoc policies concerning nonzhuanfei for certain groups of people under 
special circumstances. Most commonly, these involved workers changing from 
temporary to regular positions in state enterprises. There were also particular cases 
that arose from time to time (like the return of rusticated youths in the early reform 
era). This channel gave the state the flexibility to deal with unanticipated situations. It 
also included nongzhuanfei granted to a small number of demobilized military 
servicemen assigned urban jobs. The Hukou allowances under the special channel 
came out of sporadic but supplementary quotas for these transfers. In many cases, 
policies for Hukou transfers under the special channel were matters of joint decision 
among various government departments. As one could see from the way these policies 
were designed and implemented, a non-agricultural Hukou status was often used as a 
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 reward for those who had made significant contributions to the nation as interpreted 
by the state apparatus. Conversely, one could lose one’s non-agricultural status by 
having committed certain serious crimes (including political crimes) (MPS & MJ, 
1984; Dutton, 1992).  
Channels of Hukou status conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural are 
presented in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 Channel of Hukou Status Conversion from Agricultural to 
Non-agricultural and Policy Approval Authorities 
 Category Policy Approval 
Authorities 
Quota Issuer Quota 
 
 
 
Regular  
Channel 
 
Recruitment 
by 
state-owned 
enterprises 
Ministry of 
Labour 
 
 
State planning 
commission 
 
 
Annual 
issuance 
 
 
Enrolment in 
institutes of 
higher 
education 
State Education 
Commission 
 
 
State Planning 
Commission 
 
 
Annual 
issuance 
 
 
Promotion to 
administrative 
posts 
Ministry of 
Personnel 
 
State Planning 
Commission 
 
Annual 
issuance 
 
Personal 
reasons 
Ministry of Public 
Security 
Ministry of Public 
Security 
Fixed 
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Special 
Channel 
Transfer from 
temporary to 
regular 
positions 
Relevant 
government 
departments 
State Planning  
Commission 
Occasional 
issuance 
 Military 
demobilization 
Central Military 
Commission of 
the CCP, and 
Ministry of Civil 
Affairs 
State Council Occasional 
issuance 
 Land 
requisition by 
the State 
 State Council State Council Based on 
the size of 
the land 
requisition 
Source: Complied from various governmental documents relating to such things as 
employment, education, Hukou administration, and military service. Chan and Zhang, 
1999 
 
  Qualification of Hukou status conversion. Table 4.3 presents the qualifications 
needed by the Ministry of Public Service. 
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 Table 4.3 Qualifications for Nongzhuanfei through the MPS 
Applicant     Conditions 
Non-agricultural Hukou 
holder’s spouse 
Permanently disabled or chronically sick, unable to 
take care of oneself, without any relatives in the 
countryside to rely on 
Non-agricultural Hukou 
holder’s parents 
Aging and unable to take care of oneself, without 
any relatives in the countryside to rely on 
Non-agricultural Hukou 
holder’s children or 
adopted children  
Under 15 years old, without any relatives in the 
countryside to rely on  
Resettled urban youth 
 
Seriously sick and/or disabled, or facing serious 
hardship in the family, with the permission of 
“Educated Youth” Office at or above the county 
level 
Family members of 
workers and staff working 
in the Qinghai-Tibet 
plateau region 
Unable to adapt to the climate of the Qinghai-Tibet 
plateau 
Children of female workers 
in the geological industry 
and prospecting teams 
Inadequately cared for by their mothers due to the 
mobile nature of their work, with family members 
residing in urban areas  
Source: Based on MPS (1977) & Chan and Zhang (1999) 
 53
 
 Documents Needed. Registration of rural-to urban migration was administered by the 
public security authorities (SC, 1956). However, many government departments other 
than the MPS had real decision-making powers in granting nongzhuanfei. Although a 
permit to move and a migration certificate were issued by the police and migrants 
were required to complete the procedures of Hukou transfer administered by the 
police, the police were not the sole authority responsible for approving conversion of 
Hukou status from rural to urban. In fact, while the Hukou regulations explicitly 
stipulated the procedures for migration, they did not specify the qualifications for 
migration.  
  Table 5.5 catalogues the documentation required for Hukou registration in cities. 
Different categories of migration required different qualifications and documents, 
which were decided by various government departments other than the MPS. This left 
significant latitude for different departments to interpret and design their own policies, 
largely outside the Hukou administration. The restrictive nongzhuanfei showed that 
formal rural-to-urban migration was strictly and heavily regulated, but it was not 
controlled by the Hukou system in any sense. An approval to register was usually 
automatic when the various supporting papers were deemed valid. As a result, many 
governmental departments had de facto Nongzhuanfei approval powers as a corollary 
of their own policies, though the final step of rubber stamping was still administered 
by the MPS. (Chan and Zhang, 1999) In general, most formal urban in-migrants were 
admitted under the policies of other government departments. According to one 
survey of migration to the Beijing municipality, 63% of the cases were approved by 
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 various government departments, 24% by higher-education institutes, and 10% by 
military departments (Yang, S., 1995). These figures showed that the cases 
exclusively decided by the public security authorities constituted a very small portion 
of the total for formal rural-to-urban migration. 
 
           Table 4.4 Required Documents for Hukou Registration in Cities 
Reasons for in-migration Main document required Document issuer 
Employment Certificate of employment 
Labour Bureau at or above 
the county level 
Job transfer/job 
promotion Introduction letter 
Personnel Department or 
Labour Bureau at or above 
the county level 
Education Admission letter Institutes of tertiary education 
Demobilization of 
serviceman Introduction letter 
Regiments or military units 
at or above the county level
Return from overseas Introduction letter Chinese Embassy 
Personal reasons Certificate of transfer Police unit at or above the county level 
Homeless orphans 
adopted by urban 
civil affairs 
department 
Introduction letter Civil affairs department at municipal level 
Hukou resumption Certificate of transfer Police unit at or above the county level 
    Source: Li Zhang (2004); Wang, F (1992); Yang, S. (1995); Wang, J. (1994); Zhang, Q. et al. (1995).  
     The real power of the Hukou system in the regulation of migration did not come 
from just the system itself, but rather from its integration with other social and 
economic control systems. Particularly in the pre-reform period, formal migration 
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 operated within a political and economic context such that economic activities were 
strictly controlled by the bureaucratic apparatuses, with people’s daily lives closely 
connected to and monitored by bureaucrats. There were few opportunities for urban 
employment outside state channels. The state’s monopoly of living necessities made it 
hard to survive outside one’s place of Hukou registration without proper documents 
(Wang, 1997). People’s daily lives were tightly bound to their work units and watched 
over by the police and by residential organizations (street committees in the city and 
village committees in the countryside). Violations of the Hukou regulations were 
easily discovered. Overall, the Hukou system worked in conjunction with other 
institutions to form a multi-layered web of control, each of them administering one or 
more categories of rural-to-urban migration. The various lines of control were 
interrelated and complementary to each other. The efficacy of the state’s 
administration of rural-to-urban migration depended a great deal on the proper 
functioning of all supporting institutions, rather than on the Hukou system by itself. 
Through Nongzhuanfei, policy and quota controls, and other administrative 
mechanisms, rural-to-urban migration was fully bureaucratized. The procedures of 
Hukou registration provided certification of the legal basis for residence in one or 
another of China’s urban areas. Officially-sanctioned rural-to-urban migration 
required a formal Hukou transfer, subject to both policy and quota controls. Thus, the 
state had nearly total control of rural-to-urban migration and decided where people 
should work and reside, leaving, at the same time, little room for individual 
preference and decision. Given the predominant role of state control, the outcome of 
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 rural-to-urban migration, in geographic terms, was largely a function of state policies. 
(Chan and Zhang, 1999) 
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CHAPTER 5 
       THE HUKOU SYSTEM AND INEQUALITY IN THE REFORM ERA 
  This chapter begins a study on the Hukou system in the context of economic reform 
and changes in the Hukou system. Resource allocation based on different Hukou 
statuses and the factors that influence Hukou status conversion are examined using 
survey data from 2003 to indicate inequality under the Hukou system in the reform 
era. 
 The data used in this analysis came from the China General Social Survey 2003, 
which was conducted in 28 cities throughout all regions of the country (except 
Xinjiang, Tibet, and Qinghai). This survey adopted the sampling frame of the Fifth 
National Census and ultimately yielded 5,894 effective questionnaire forms. The 
survey questionnaire contains extensive information on social stratification, mobility, 
and social network. Information on Hukou status and the experience of Hukou status 
conversion of the respondents and their family members made the data from this 
survey well suited for this study. Respondents’ Hukou status, income, access to 
welfare services, education, employment, political affiliation, and similar information 
about the respondents’ father are exploited in the following analyses. 
 
5.1 The Hukou system in the reform era 
 Since the reforms, both the transformation of the urban economy and the infusion of 
foreign investment have put pressure on labour supply, especially the supply of cheap 
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 labour, in urban areas (Liang & White, 1997). Meanwhile, labour problems in the 
countryside have been further exacerbated by the increasing magnitude of surplus 
agricultural labour because of improvements in agricultural productivity (Shen, 1995). 
Many new jobs, such as nannies, restaurant servers, and factory workers are at the 
lower end of the occupational stratum and are not desired by regular urbanites (Fan, 
2001). Accordingly, a new “pull” for labour is exerted by urban areas. At the same 
time, the “push” factor from the countryside is the increasing surplus agricultural 
labour because of improvement in agricultural productivity. Due to this, the state was 
compelled to relax migration control. Rather than removing the Hukou system, the 
state added provisions to it that facilitate the “temporary” migration of peasants to 
work in urban areas (Wong & Huen, 1998). The development of the economy needed 
a reform of the Hukou system and the institutional reform made the reform of the 
Hukou system possible. 
  5.1.1 The Hukou system and institutional reform 
Institutional reforms have been the centrepiece of the overall economic reform 
programs in China since the late 1970s. Traditional institutions, such as collective 
farming, state ownership of means of industry production, central planning, and the 
labour employment and remuneration system are considered to be the root cause of 
poor economic performance during the pre-reform era (Liu, 2005). In the past two 
decades, the two mechanisms on which the Hukou system relies underwent radical 
reforms. For the mechanism of “central control over employment” on the rural side, 
the commune system was replaced by the household contract responsibility system, 
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 which made individual households responsible for particular plots and allowed 
producers to sell any surplus grain on the open market, greatly improving the 
efficiency of agricultural production (Liang 2001), and fully fired the enthusiasm of 
Chinese farmers and made tremendous achievements in the rural economy. By 1984, 
fully 95% of former production teams had contracted land to households and adopted 
independent household management (Selden, 1993). As the reform in the countryside 
led to a dramatic rise in productivity and created a large pool of surplus labourers, 
peasants tried to seek jobs in the industrial and service sectors. On the urban side, with 
emergence of domestic and foreign capital state-directed allocation of labour 
gradually had to give way to a less rigid labour market in which people could attempt 
to secure jobs on an individual basis (Alexander & Chan, 2004). The growing private 
sector and foreign capital outside the redistributive system demanded more cheap 
labour. Even some state-owned work units preferred to hire rural peasants either 
because they had no commitment to peasant-workers’ housing and other social 
benefits or because the jobs were unattractive to urban workers (Wu, 2004). With the 
deepening economic reforms in both rural and urban areas, the mechanism of central 
control over employment was abolished. 
After improved supplies and free markets, rationing and the coupon system lost 
much of its former importance and most products could now be bought with money. 
In September 1980, the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Food and 
National Personnel Authority issued “The Regulation of Food Supply by Nation” or 
the specialty cadres’ rural family members who moved into urban areas. This 
 60
 
 regulation began to break the quota control of household registration. Following good 
harvests and dietary changes, many provinces completely did away with grain 
coupons in the early 1990s (Mallee, 1995). By the close of the eighties, with the 
prices of food and goods now largely set by the market, the ration-coupon system had 
vanished. 
Gradually, the state stopped allocating most jobs, allowing a labour market to thrive. 
Figure 5.1 shows the institutions in the reform era.  
 
Figure 5.1 Institutions in the Reform Era 
 
5.1.2 The reform of the Hukou system 
  The development of the Chinese economy in the 1980s and the radical 
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 institutional reform have had the greatest impacts on rural-urban population mobility. 
Under these circumstances, the Hukou system, which is the only system inherited 
from the planned economy to monitor population migration, underwent piecemeal 
reforms. 
   Policies concerning reforms of the Hukou system 
  Along with reforms of the centrally planned economic system and the rapid 
development of the Chinese economy, population movement between the countryside 
and cities has increased since the 1980s, and a more flexible Hukou policy was 
adopted. Although there were still restrictions on movement through the Hukou 
system, they were considerably relaxed.  
Table 5.1 Policies Concerning Reforms of the Hukou System since 1979 
Issue Date 
(mm/yy) 
      Issuer     Document Title 
09/1980 Ministry of Public Security 
& Ministry of food and 
National Personnel 
Authority 
The Regulation of food supply by 
nation for the specialty cadres’ rural 
family members who move into 
urban areas 
06/1984 The State Council Circular on the tentative regulations 
for the application of the system 
concerning the recruitment of rural 
rotating worker in mine-excavating 
enterprises 
07/1985 Ministry of Public Security The Regulation for the management 
of the transient population in towns 
12/1985 National People’s Congress 
Standing Committee 
Articles of Citizens' Identification 
Cards of PRC 
08/1992 Ministry of Public Security Circulars of carrying out the local 
effective registered residence 
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 1997 The State Council Suggestions submitted by the 
Ministry of Public Security 
concerning the experimental work of 
reform of the household registration 
system in small towns 
1998 The State Council Circular of the State Council on the 
Approval and Transmission of the 
Suggestions submitted by the 
Ministry of Public Security 
concerning the prominent problems 
of current administration of 
residence revoked the restriction of 
settling down in medium-seized 
cities 
05/2001 The State Council The reform of the household 
registration system in small towns 
2006 The State Council Suggestions on Resolving the Farmer 
Workers’ Problem 
2008 Hunan Provincial 
Government 
Suggestion on Promoting 
Urbanization 
02/2009 Shanghai Municipal 
Government 
Interim Implementation for People 
Holds “Residence Permit” to Apply 
Permanent Residence in Shanghai 
04/2009 Guangdong Provincial 
Government 
Regulation on the service and 
management of the floating 
population in Guangdong Province 
(Draft) 
 
The first important legal measure was enacted in 1984 by the Circular of the State 
Council of the People's Republic of China, when the State Council allowed people 
with a rural Hukou to move freely to the 60,000 towns (zhen) below the county level 
(Messkoub & Davin, 2000). This circular stipulated that peasants and their relatives 
who have had jobs, done business, engaged in the service industry, or had a permanent 
job in township enterprises and institutions, were allowed to settle in town under the 
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 condition of self-care. When this circular made population movements possible, the 
household registration system in towns shifted from “quota control” to “admittance 
condition control.”  
In 2006, The State Council issued Suggestions on Resolving the Farmer Workers’ 
Problem. The requirement for peasant workers to get the permanent residence in cities 
is relaxed in this regulation. At the end of 2006, 12 provinces has abolished the 
division of agricultural and non-agricultural Hukou,  
 On January 1, 2008 , Yunan province abolished the dual Hukou system of 
agricultural and non-agricultural, unified into residence Hukou. On October 1, 2008  
Jiaxing City in Zhejiang Province also abolished the agricultural Hukou. In the same 
year, Hunan Province introduced the Suggestion on Promoting Urbanization, the 
regulation aims at establishing unified Hukou system in Hunan Province and 
promoting migration of population. 
On February 23, 2009, Shanghai Municipal Government issued Interim 
Implementation for People Holds “Residence Permit” to Apply Permanent Residence 
in Shanghai, people who lived in the city more than five years are granted the 
permanent Hukou in Shanghai. On August 1, 2009, Taiyuan in Shanxi Province 
introduced the Regulation of Residential Tenancies for Non-local Hukou Residents, 
people who lived in the city more than five years are granted the permanent Hukou in 
Taiyuan.  
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 5.1.3 Changes in the Hukou system 
Temporary residence certificate. This was important progress in the reform of the 
Hukou system. The rapid growth of population migration during the 1980s (Mallee, 
1995) made the problem of temporary residence acute. The 1958 regulation 
stipulating that temporary residence of more than three days must be reported and that 
stays of over three months must be approved by the police, soon proved hard to 
enforce (Mallee, 1995). In July, 1985, after some local experiments such as the 
introduction of a new set of regulations governing temporary residence for workers 
without local Hukou registration in Wuhan (Solinger, 1985), a similar nationwide 
system (“The Regulation about the Management of Transient Population in Town” 
issued by the Ministry of Public Security) introduced procedures for obtaining 
temporary urban Hukou for those who stayed over three months in the city (Messkoub 
& Davin, 2000). This regulation established the legitimacy of long-term living in a 
place of non-registered residence.   
 Citizen identity card. In December 1985, the National People’s Congress Standing 
Committee issued “Articles of Citizens' Identification Cards of PRC.” The articles 
stipulate that residents could show their citizen identification cards as identification 
when they attended transactions involving politics, economics, and social life. Its use 
also changed the unit of administration of registration from one book per household in 
cities and towns and one book per village in the countryside to one card per person. 
This new approach, entailing both individuality and portability, was better suited to 
the new circumstance of population mobility (Chan & Zhang, 1999). 
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 Changes in the Hukou status conversion policy. The Hukou conversion policy also 
underwent great changes. In the pre-reform era, Hukou conversion was core to any 
formal rural-urban migration and involved many departments at various levels 
(Mallee, 1995). In the reform period, there have been some measures to merge the 
Hukou “place of registration” with the Hukou “status” into one single classification. 
The policy control has been relaxed by opening a special channel and allowing an 
increased quota of Hukou conversion in this channel (Chan & Zhang, 1999). 
According to Yuan Congwu, the former Minister of Public Security, in 1993 there 
were 23 policy provisions for Hukou conversion, compared to only nine in the 1950s 
(Yin & Yu, 1996). Mainly because of the relaxation of the Hukou conversion policy, 
from 1979 to 1995 the non-agricultural Hukou population grew at an average of 7.8 
million per year, or 3.7%. This was about twice as high as the average rate (2.5 
million or 1.9% per year) in the period between 1963 and 1978 (Chan & Zhang, 
1999).  
 
 5.1.4 The introduction of the new urban Hukou 
Households with “self-supplied food grain” in towns. With de-collectivization in 
the early 1980s, the rapidly swelling surplus rural labour force needed to find jobs 
outside agriculture (Chan & Zhang, 1999). In November 1984, the State Council 
endorsed a conditional opening of market towns to peasants. Peasants were allowed to 
get a new type of urban Hukou called a “self-supplied food grain” Hukou in market 
towns, provided that they satisfied a number of requirements (MPS, 1984; Mallee, 
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 1995). The main requirements were that these migrants would either be employed or 
run businesses of their own and find their own places to live. They would also have to 
make their own food-grain arrangements (Chan & Zhang, 1999). By 1988, the total 
population in this new category had reached 4 million (Cheng, 1991). This kind of 
town Hukou formally legitimated the right of certain peasants to break their ties to the 
land and move to urban areas (Zhang, 2004). Yet the holders of this kind of urban 
Hukou were not eligible for state-subsidized welfare. Above all, they could not take 
this new kind of Hukou to urban areas of administrative status higher than that of the 
town they had just been permitted to move to (MPS,1991). However, once new 
opportunities for urban Hukou became available in the late 1980s, this particular 
variant lost its popularity. It appeared that the program was terminated some time in 
the early 1990s (Zhang, 2004).  
The “Blue-Stamp” urban Hukou. Sales of Hukou and the “blue-stamp” urban 
Hukou were also introduced to cope with the new situation of migration. In the late 
1980s, many locales started some form of a “urban citizenship for sale” practice. In 
order to rationalize this practice, a new type of Hukou, called a “locally-valid” urban 
Hukou, was formally endorsed by the central government (Chan & Zhang, 1999). In 
August 1992, the Ministry of Public Security issued the “Circular on Implementation 
of Locally-Valid Urban Hukou Registration,” whereby the “locally-valid” urban 
Hukou was extended to the whole state. This was distinguished by a blue stamp, 
different from the formal urban Hukou book that carried a red stamp. The 
“blue-stamp” urban Hukou opened more cities and towns, including large cities (Chan 
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 & Zhang, 1999). Different from the “temporary resident permit,” which can be issued 
to anyone who has a legitimate job or business in the city, the blue-stamp Hukou was 
issued to investors, buyers of property, and professionals (Liu, 2005). The holders of a 
blue-stamp Hukou were usually required to pay a one-time entry fee, namely, the 
urban infrastructural construction fee, which varied from a few thousand yuan in 
small cities and towns to 50,000 yuan in more attractive cities. This blue card 
functioned more like the regular Hukou; its holders enjoyed most of the 
community-based benefits and rights (Liu, 2005). The introduction of the 
“blue-stamp” Hukou was a major step in legalizing the commodification of Hukou. It 
represented a new direction in the management of rural-to-urban migration by the 
central government (Zhang, 2004). 
Since 1997 and especially since 2001, there have been so-called “deep reforms” of 
the Hukou system. Various schemes such as the locally-defined “entry conditions” for 
permanent migration, nicknamed “local Hukou in exchange for talents/skills and 
investment,” have significantly increased the mobility of selected groups of people 
(People’s Daily, 2001). Now, anyone who has a stable non-agricultural income and a 
permanent residence in a small city or town for at least two years will automatically 
qualify for an urban Hukou and become a permanent local resident (China Civil 
Affairs, 2001). Some medium and even large cities are also authorized to do the same, 
with a higher and more specific income, employment, and residence requirement 
(People’s Daily, 2001). 
  From the mid-1990s, journalists have been interpreting official statements on 
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 “reforms” of the Hukou system as presaging an end to the system as we know it. For 
example, as early as February 1994, Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post 
published an article entitled, ‘‘Registration system set to be abolished,’’ reporting a 
Chinese proposal to drop the classification of agricultural and non-agricultural 
populations (1994, Feb., p. 7). Many other pieces carrying similar messages were 
published in the Hong Kong and Western press between 1994 and early 2005, with 
headlines proclaiming a new era of freedom for peasants and the collapse of city walls 
(Chan, 2008). In these media reports, the Hukou system no longer seemed to be 
functional. But these descriptions stand in stark contrast to the analysis provided by 
scholars working on this topic. Feiling Wang’s analysis of the Hukou system 
concludes that ‘‘this omnipresent and powerful, albeit adapted and adjusted, system is 
alive and well’’(Wang, 2004). Are the news reports careless readings of China by 
inexperienced observers? Despite the scholarly naysayers, does the reform of Hukou 
system eliminate the inequalities between rural and urban Hukou holders? These 
questions have prompted me to look into the topic of the impact of the Hukou system 
in the reform era more carefully. The next two sections elaborate the inequality under 
the Hukou system from the aspects of resource allocation and the Hukou status 
conversion process. 
 
5.2 Hukou status and resource allocation in the reform era 
   After almost 20 years reform of the Hukou system, does the unequal resource 
allocation between different Hukou statuses still persist? To answer this question, data 
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 from China General Social Survey 2003 is applied in the following study. The survey 
was conducted in 28 cities from all regions of the country (except Xinjiang, Tibet, and 
Qinghai), yielding a national probability sample of 5,894 adults. The dependent 
variables that were chosen for measuring the resource allocation are: monthly income, 
management level, provision of basic medical care, basic old-age insurance, 
unemployment insurance, and housing and housing benefit. The independent variable 
is different Hukou types: urban Hukou and non-urban Hukou status. 
Monthly income was recoded into 4 levels; 1=below 1499RMB, 2=1500 to 
2499RMB, 3=2500 to 3499RMB, and 4=above 3500RMB. The variable of 
management has four values: non-managers, low-level managers, middle-level 
managers and senior managers. The rest of the variables all have two values of yes 
and no. 
  Table 5.2 presents the economic condition of floating population and the 
comparison with those who have the urban Hukou status.  
                  Table 5.2 Monthly Income By Hukou Type 
 
 
 
Monthly 
Income 
              HUKOU TYPE 
Non-Urban Hukou      Urban Hukou 
    n      %      n    % 
Below 
1500RMB 
   311 86.9% 4295 86.9% 
1500-2499RMB    25 
 
7.0% 454 9.2% 
2500-3499RMB 
 
9 
 
2.5% 
 
109 
 
2.2% 
 
Above 
3500RMB 
13 3.6% 
 
83 
 
1.7% 
 
 
Total 
 
358 
 
100% 
 
4941 
 
100% 
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  Table 5.2 reveals that residents who have non-urban Hukou status have higher 
monthly incomes than those who have urban Hukou status. With 3.6% of non-urban 
Hukou residents having more than 2,500 yuan monthly income, the urban Hukou 
holders’ percentage is 1.7%. For residents who have non-urban Hukou status, the 
average monthly income is 921 yuan, the median is 600 yuan, and the standard 
deviation is 0.083; for those who have urban Hukou status, the average monthly 
income is 705 yuan, the median is 500 yuan, and the standard deviation is 0.035. This 
result shows that monthly income levels of non-urban Hukou residents is a little 
higher than that of urban Hukou residents, but also more diverse. This result can be 
explained by the fact that most urban Hukou holders usually work in state-owned 
units that provide a low salary but high welfare, while those who have non-urban 
Hukou status are more likely self-employed or work in private enterprise or foreign 
business providing a higher salary but less welfare.  
 To test the foregoing explanation and to further explore resource allocation based on 
different Hukou type in the reform era, it is necessary to examine the relationship 
between Hukou type and welfare. Tables 5.3 to 5.6 separately show the cross 
tabulation of Hukou type and provision of basic medical care, basic old-age insurance, 
unemployment insurance, and housing or housing benefit. Urban Hukou status holders 
have an advantage because they enjoy all kinds of welfare: only 18.9% of non-urban 
Hukou holders enjoy basic medical care, while on the other hand, 58.7% of urban 
Hukou holders enjoy this welfare; 20.9% of non-urban Hukou holders enjoy basic 
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 old-age insurance, but the percentage is 67.8% for the urban Hukou holders; the 
percentages are respectively 8.4% and 32.5% for non-urban Hukou and urban Hukou 
holders who have unemployment insurance; for the provision of housing or housing 
benefit, 13.4% of urban Hukou holders and only 41.1% of non-urban Hukou holders 
enjoy this welfare. 
Table 5.3 Provision of Basic Medical Care By Hukou Type 
Provision 
of Basic 
Medical 
Care 
                   HUKOU TYPE 
Urban Hukou    Non-Urban Hukou 
 
 
No 
    n      %      n    % 
1765 41.3% 129  81.1% 
 
Yes 
 
 2506 
 
58.7% 
 
30 
 
18.9% 
 
Total 
 
4271 
 
100% 
 
159 
 
100% 
                                                Missing: 1, 464 
 
Table 5.4 Provision of Basic Old-Age Insurance By Hukou Type 
Provision 
of Basic 
Old-Age 
Insurance 
                   HUKOU TYPE 
  Urban Hukou    Non-Urban Hukou 
 
 
No 
    n      %      n    % 
1380     32.2%    125   79.1% 
 
Yes 
 
2901 
 
67.8% 
 
33 
 
20.9% 
 
Total 
 
   4281 
 
    100% 
 
   158 
 
  100% 
                                                 Missing:1,455 
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Table 5.5 Provision of Unemployment Insurance By Hukou Type 
Provision of  
Unemployment 
Insurance 
                   HUKOU TYPE 
Urban Hukou    Non-Urban Hukou 
 
 
No 
    n      %      n    % 
2680 67.5% 141 91.6% 
 
Yes 
 
1288 
 
32.5% 
 
13 
 
8.4% 
 
Total 
 
3968 
 
100% 
 
154 
 
100% 
                                                    Missing: 1,772 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.6 Provision of Housing or Housing Benefit By Hukou Type 
Provision 
of Housing 
or Housing 
Benefit 
                   HUKOU TYPE 
Urban Hukou      Non-Urban Hukou 
 
 
No 
    n      %      n    % 
2550 58.9% 142 86.6% 
 
Yes 
 
1778 
 
41.1% 
 
 22 
 
13.4% 
 
Total 
 
4328 
 
100% 
 
 164 
  
100% 
                                             Missing: 1,402 
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Table 5.7 presents the cross tabulation of Hukou type and management level. The 
results show that 2.5% of non-urban Hukou holders work at middle or high 
management level, while 9.5% of urban Hukou holders work at middle or high 
management level. It is thus clear that differences of Hukou status exist at the 
management level, since the one who has urban Hukou status is more likely to be 
promoted. 
 
  
 
            Table 5.7 Management Level By Hukou Type  
 
 
Management 
Level 
                   HUKOU TYPE 
Urban Hukou     Non-Urban Hukou 
    N      %      n    % 
Non-Managers 1888 69.7% 129 81.6% 
Low-Level 
Managers 
562 20.8% 25 15.8% 
Middle-Level 
Managers 
203 7.5% 4 2.5% 
Senior 
Managers 
 
54 
 
2.0% 
 
0 
 
.0% 
 
Total 
 
2707 
 
100% 
 
158 
 
100% 
                                                       Missing: 3,029 
 Without obtaining urban Hukou, migrants still don’t have access to subsidized 
benefits and must rely entirely on themselves for housing and other necessities. They 
are also excluded from the more prestigious and desirable jobs at the management 
level. At the general level, this Hukou reform initiative does little, if anything, to 
break down China’s significant rural–urban divide, and the walls between rural and 
urban social space remain powerful. In the past, the rural–urban divide was defined 
with reference to the ‘‘agricultural’’ and ‘‘nonagricultural’’ Hukou determined by the 
state (controlled by the central government). At present, the divide remains: it is based 
on differentiating between the ‘‘locals’’ and the ‘‘outsiders’’ (migrants from the 
countryside) (Chan, 2008). The findings indicate that with the rapid, but segmented 
and uneven economic growth, the rural-urban Hukou status divisions and horizontal 
socioeconomic stratification are likely to persevere. 
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 5.3 Hukou status conversion in the reform era 
  Although governmental policies had encouraged urban residents to move formally 
to rural areas, there was essentially no voluntary mobility in that direction given the 
huge advantage associated with urban Hukou status. Hukou status conversion, 
therefore, was mainly from rural status to urban status, which was highly limited by 
governmental regulation (Wu, 2004). Since the Hukou status conversion was almost 
unidirectional, conversion from rural to urban is examined in this section by applying 
survey data from 2003. 
  5.3.1 Hypotheses 
  According to chapter 4, the regular channels of Hukou status conversion from rural 
to urban were enrolment in institutes of higher education, recruitment by state-owned 
enterprises and promotion to administrative posts, and the special channels were 
transfers from temporary to regular positions and military demobilization. Here are 
the main factors that I think govern the conversion of Hukou status. 
  The first is education. According to Hukou regulations, students are granted urban 
Hukou status upon admission to specialized secondary or tertiary school (State 
Council, 1986[1958]). Access to urban primary and specialized secondary and tertiary 
schools is open to all citizens on the basis of merit (usually assessed by examination 
scores). Thus, junior high school graduates with a rural Hukou have two strategies for 
gaining an urban Hukou via higher education. The first is to gain admission to a 
specialized secondary school, which confers urban Hukou status immediately upon 
admission. The second is to gain admission to senior high school and then to try to get 
 75
 
 admitted to a tertiary school. Tertiary education confers both urban Hukou status and 
non-manual jobs (Wu, 2004). Thus, I expect, other things being equal, that people 
with higher levels of education are more likely to change Hukou status than are those 
with lower levels of education. 
  Two other ways of changing Hukou status are recruitment by state-owned 
enterprises and promotion to administrative posts. This shows the importance of 
employment status on Hukou status conversion. The urban Hukou is almost 
guaranteed after gaining a full-time job in a city. A new type of urban Hukou in the 
reform era, the temporary resident permit, can be issued to anyone who has a 
legitimate job or business in the city. Based on this regulation, I expect that people 
who find a full-time job are more likely to change Hukou status. 
  With the reform of the Hukou system since the 1980s, sales of urban Hukou and the 
“blue-stamp” urban Hukou have also been introduced. Paying a one-time entry fee 
(namely, the urban infrastructural construction fee), one can get the “blue-stamp” 
urban Hukou. The urban Hukou is closely related to economic status in the reform era. 
Thus, I expect people with higher monthly incomes are more likely to change Hukou 
status than those with lower monthly incomes. 
  Joining the Chinese Communist Party is also an important way to change Hukou 
status. Although CCP membership does not guarantee an urban Hukou status, political 
loyalty manifested in this way is thought to improve upward career mobility and 
eventually the odds of gaining an urban Hukou. For example, rural CCP members 
may be able to serve as rural “cadres.” Some of these “peasant cadres” are promoted 
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 to leadership positions at the township level, making them part of the state 
bureaucratic system and hence eligible to change to urban Hukou status (Wu, 2004). 
This career path suggests that CCP members are more likely to change Hukou status 
than are non-CCP members. 
  In examination of the potential to obtain urban Hukou status, gender inequality 
must be considered. Rural women are particularly disadvantaged in acquiring 
educational and political credentials. They are less likely to enjoy the sponsorship of 
their families because sons generally have priority when a family uses social 
connections for its children’s future (Lin 2000, p. 291). Hence, I expect that men are 
more likely to change Hukou status than are women. 
  Children inherit Hukou status from their families. Parents’ Hukou type largely 
influences children’s Hukou type and Hukou status conversion. Urban connections in 
a mixed Hukou family (typically an urban father and a rural mother) may facilitate 
Hukou mobility. Because children’s Hukou status generally follows that of their 
mothers (State Council 1986 [1958]), urban-status fathers in mixed Hukou families 
cannot easily transfer their occupational achievement in the urban sector to their 
children. However, the sharp contrast between rural and urban Hukou is especially 
salient within such families, which may provide not only additional motivation for 
children to change their lives, but also access to urban resources that offer information 
on how to take advantage of educational and employment possibilities. I expect that 
people whose father have urban Hukou status are more likely to change Hukou status. 
The dingti policy of the 1980s allowed one child to take over the parent’s job when 
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 the parent retired; thus, children who were born to rural mothers and urban fathers 
could change their Hukou status from rural to urban if they took over their fathers’ 
jobs (Bian, 1994, p. 55; Walder, 1986, p. 67). Hence, all else being equal, people 
whose fathers had a full-time job in a city are more likely to have changed Hukou 
status than are people whose fathers were not employed in state work units. 
  5.3.2 Data and variables 
  The data employed in this analysis are from the China General Social Survey 2003, 
a national probability sample of 5,894 adults from all regions of China (except 
Xinjiang, Tibet, and Qinghai). The survey questionnaire contains information on 
mobility and characteristics of family members. Information on whether the 
respondents have experienced Hukou status conversion, a respondent’s Hukou status, 
education, occupation, income, political affiliation, and similar information about the 
respondent’s father are exploited in the following analysis.  
To examine the factors that influence the conversion of Hukou status from rural to 
urban, it is necessary to restrict the analysis to those who have rural Hukou origin. 
People whose original Hukou status was rural, those who have rural Hukou status in 
the survey year (2003), and those who have experienced Hukou status conversion 
from rural to urban were selected. The following analysis employs 2,112 cases.  
  The dependent variable is whether Hukou status conversion from rural to urban was 
experienced. The variable coded as 1=Yes, 0=No. Seven independent variables 
pertinent to these hypotheses are included: education level, employment status, 
monthly income, party membership, gender, father’s Hukou type, and father’s 
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 employment status. 
  Education level appears to be a major factor affecting the odds of changing Hukou 
status from rural to urban. To distinguish the educational levels leading automatically 
to urban Hukou, I recoded education into three levels: junior high school or lower, 
senior high school, and specialized secondary school or higher. 
  To distinguish the impact of employment on the Hukou status conversion, the 
respondent’s employment status is recoded into three levels: jobless or farming, 
part-time employment, and full-time employment. 
  Monthly income is recoded into 4 levels: 1=below 1499RMB, 2=1500 to 
2499RMB, 3=2500 to 3499RMB, and 4=above 3500RMB. 
  Party membership was coded as a dichotomy; party members=1, nonmember=0. Of 
the 5,778 respondents who answered the question, “Are you a party member?” 1,077 
were party members, accounting for 18.6%. Gender was coded male=1 and female=0. 
The father’s Hukou type was recoded as a dichotomy: urban Hukou=1, rural 
Hukou=0. 
 Father’s employment status was also recoded into four levels: retired, jobless or 
farming, part-time employment, and full-time employment. 
 
  5.3.3 Gaining urban Hukou status: a logistic regression analysis 
Table 5.8 presents the coefficients for two binary logistic regression models of 
Hukou status conversion from rural to urban. Model 1 estimates the odds of variables 
that are thought to affect the odds of converting Hukou from rural to urban directly. 
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 Model 2 adds the variables that are thought to affect the odds of Hukou mobility 
indirectly: gender and family background. Most of the results from both Model 1 and 
Model 2 are consistent with my hypotheses; each independent variable has a 
significant effect on the Hukou status conversion except the variable of gender. 
 
Table 5.8 Coefficients for Binary Logistic Regression Models of Hukou Status 
Conversion from Rural to Urban 
Independent Variables 
 
 
Constant 
 
Education Level 
 
Employment status 
 
Monthly Income 
 
Party membership 
 
Sex 
 
Father’s Hukou type 
 
Father’s employment status 
 
X2 
-2Log likelihood 
N (total: 2101) 
R2 
Model 1     Model 2 
  B          S.E.   B         S.E. 
-1.744﹡﹡﹡     .401 
.718﹡﹡﹡     .118 
.875﹡﹡﹡     .131 
- .438﹡﹡﹡     .124 
1.218﹡﹡﹡     .322 
.055         .167 
 
 
 
 
 
176.506﹡﹡﹡ 
964.893 
1167 
.225 
-2.923﹡﹡﹡     .650 
.814﹡﹡﹡      .149 
1.202﹡﹡﹡     .209 
-.419﹡       .164 
1.634﹡﹡﹡   .436 
-.265      .231 
 
2.384﹡﹡﹡     .284 
-.209          .125 
      
249.336﹡﹡﹡ 
      525.859 
       762 
      . 437 
 
Note: 
﹡﹡﹡ p<.001  ﹡﹡ p< .01 ﹡ p< .05 
First, as expected, given regulations that normally grant urban Hukou status upon 
enrollment in specialized schools or tertiary institutions, the effects of education level 
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 are strong and positive (P<.001). With one unit of change of education level, the odds 
of converting Hukou status from rural to urban increase .718 times in Model 1, 
and .814 times in Model 2. The talented people (or those privileged to gain more 
education) have more chance to convert rural Hukou status to urban. Education, which 
is well known to be both an engine of social mobility and a mechanism of social 
reproduction (Treiman & Yip, 1989), also facilitates Hukou status conversion from 
rural to urban.  
As expected, employment status has significant (P<.001) and positive effects on 
Hukou status conversion from rural to urban. Controlling all other independent 
variables as the employment status varies from jobless or farming to part-time job 
then to full–time job, the odds of converting Hukou status increase .875 times in 
Model 1 and 1.202 times in Model 2. 
Monthly income also has significant effects on Hukou status conversion. (P<0.001 
in Model 1, P<.05 in Model 2). Different from my hypothesis, with the one level 
increase of monthly income, the odds of experiencing Hukou conversion from rural to 
urban decreases .438 times in Model 1 and .419 times in Model 2. This result 
corresponded to the results in Table 5.2, which indicate that urban Hukou holders do 
not have the advantage in monthly income. Another possible reason for this result is 
that the number of high-income people is too small and so they have limited 
contribution to the model. 
Party membership sharply increases the odds of converting Hukou status from rural 
to urban. The odds of gaining urban Hukou status increase 1.206 times if a person has 
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 party membership. In Model 2, with party membership, the odds of converting Hukou 
status from rural to urban increase 1.399 times. The result is consistent with Wu’s 
(2004) findings, which show that education and membership in the Chinese 
Communist Party are the main determinants of transforming one’s Hukou status from 
rural to urban. 
Contrary to my expectation, gender shows no significant relationship. The first 
column shows a positive sign and the second column shows a negative sign. They are 
both insignificant. This result indicates the gender variable does not have much effect 
on the odds of converting Hukou status. Gender difference in this aspect is not 
significant. 
Consistent with my expectation, a father’s Hukou type and employment status have 
significant (P<.001) and positive effects on the dependent variable. This indicates that 
as an “ascribed” attribute, gaining an urban Hukou is largely influenced by family 
background.  
   It is true that restrictions for permanent migration have been reduced, but they are 
relevant only for the rich, the educated, and family members of existing urban 
residents. The strictly controlled Hukou status conversion from rural to urban has been 
replaced by the locally defined but nationally enforced “entry conditions” or 
“requirements” (Chan, 2008). Property ownership and education/skill levels will serve 
as an effective and more efficient economic tool to regulate China’s internal migration 
based on the Hukou system than the old administratively maintained migration quotas.  
  Due to the selective relaxation of internal-migration controls that has been the 
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 favorite reform measure in major urban centres, we may actually see an even higher 
concentration of capital and talent or educated labour in the few major urban centres 
like Beijing and Shanghai, creating even more internal brain drain and capital drain on 
the rest of the country. Increasingly, the reform appears to be replacing the 
“urban-rural Hukou duality” with one of a “rich-poor Hukou divide” (Wang, 2005b) 
and “haves vs. have-nots divide.” 
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 CHAPTER 6 
                         CONCLUSION 
The primary concern of this thesis has been to examine how the Hukou system has 
contributed to inequalities in individuals’ life chances and whether these inequalities 
continue today.  
To answer these questions, I attempted to clarify the creation, basic operation and 
reform of Hukou system. Specifically, I have examined resource allocation based on 
different Hukou status and Hukou status mobility before and in the reform era. 
Qualitative data based on regulations and policy documents was applied to examine 
how the resource was allocated differently between different Hukou holders and how 
the Hukou status conversion process was strictly controlled in the pre-reform era. 
Quantitative data from the China General Social Survey 2003 was applied to analyze 
the correlation between Hukou type and resource allocation and to measure what 
factors influence Hukou status conversion from rural to urban in the reform era.  
In the pre-reform era, the urban residents were advantaged in employment, basic 
food, income, housing, right for urban residence, and social security. The state took 
responsibility for taking care the urban citizens’ life in these aspects. But rural 
residents were almost self-sufficient in these aspects. The Hukou status conversion 
process from rural to urban was strictly controlled by the dual mechanism of ‘policy’ 
and ‘quota’, and the regular channels for Hukou status conversion are recruitment by 
state-owned enterprises, enrolment in institutes of higher education and promotion to 
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 administrative posts. Applying the data from CGSS 2003, the urban Hukou holders 
proved to enjoy welfare advantages of basic medical care, basic old-age insurance, 
unemployment insurance and housing and housing benefit in reform era. The 
respondents’ education level, employment status, party membership, father’s Hukou 
type and father’s employment status all have positive and significant effects on the 
odds of Hukou status conversion from rural to urban. 
   The findings clearly indicate that the impact of Hukou system on inequality 
remain with respect to resource allocation and Hukou status conversion. After 20 
years’ reform, the inequalities still exist. 
  In the pre-reform era, the Hukou system differentiated resources for the entire 
population on the basis of position within a clearly defined spatial hierarchy. (Cheng, 
1994) At present, the divide remains one based on differentiating between the 
‘‘locals’’ and the ‘‘outsiders’’ (migrants from the countryside) (Chan, 2008) inside 
the cities. The strictly controlled “quota” and “policy” for Hukou status conversion 
from rural to urban was replaced by the locally defined but nationally enforced “entry 
conditions” or “requirements”. (Wang, 2005b) The relaxation of Hukou-based 
migration control is likely to continue to be controlled on a localized basis. The rich 
and the talented people may now overcome the Hukou-based exclusion with ease, as 
“the urban-rural Hukou duality” is gradually replaced by the “rich-poor divide” and 
“haves--have-nots divide”. 
  With its deep roots and many rationalizations, the PRC version of Hukou system is 
alive and well. The consequences of the Hukou system will continue to constitute the 
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 peculiarities of Chinese institutions and the Chinese way of life. It will still take a 
long period of time to eliminate the inequality under Hukou system. Further 
development of the Chinese political economy may reduce the intensity and the extent 
of the Hukou-based inequality in individual’s lives. To make the PRC Hukou system 
transform from the administrative social control and institutional exclusion to merely 
a system of simple residential registration and identification, we should continue to 
deepen reform of Hukou system. 
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